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895 
THE GOOD AMERICAN LEGISLATOR: SOME LEGAL 
PROCESS PERSPECTIVES AND POSSIBILITIES 
Robert F. Blomquist* 
Compared to the role of individual judges in the American legal 
system, the role of individual legislators is under-theorized.  Legal 
writings about legislators (individually and in the aggregate) fall into 
seven general categories: (1) discussions of legislative intent in the 
interpretation of statutes, (2) examinations of the qualification and 
election of legislative representatives (including ballot access issues, 
regulation of political parties and their selection of candidates, and 
financing election campaigns), (3) corruption (by bribery or conflicts of 
interest) of a legislator, (4) immunities of a legislator, (5) lobbying of a 
legislator, (6) legislative leadership (such as the role of a speaker of the 
house, senate president or committee chair), and (7) the agency problem 
whereby a legislator may betray his or her constituent’s interest by 
various means (such as self-dealing, advancing the interests of an 
undeserving faction, simple laziness, or, even political courage to 
advance the representative’s personal conceptions of the public 
interest).1  Yet, a recurring deficiency of the legal literature on individual 
legislators is a general lack of normative theory about the attributes of a 
“good” legislator. 
In this Article, I intend to sketch some theoretical attributes of the 
good American legislator.  To do this I will draw upon and extrapolate 
from the insights of the American legal process theory of law developed 
 
*  Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  B.S. University of Pennsylvania 
(Wharton School), 1973.  J.D. Cornell University, 1977.  My thanks go to colleagues who offered 
helpful comments of a previous draft that I presented to a Society of Legal Scholars (SLS) 
Conference at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford University in September 2003.  I am also grateful to 
the following individuals who offered useful comments: Daniel Farber, Philip Frickey, Alex 
Geisinger, Robert F. Williams and Geri Yonover. 
 1. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 121-1098 (3d ed. 2001); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 183-1110 (3d 
ed. 2001). 
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after World War II by Professor Lon Fuller in his 1949 law review 
article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,2 and by Professors Henry 
M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks in their 1958 law casebook, The Legal 
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law.3  
Building on this foundation, in my normative project of defining the 
good American legislator, I will also extract themes from three recent 
groups of “new legal process” theorists who have written about 
legislation and statutory interpretation over the last two decades: 
“process formalists” such as Professor Daniel Farber, “process 
progressives” such as Professors Ronald Dworkin and  Professor 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., and “process pragmatists” such as Judge 
Richard A. Posner.  While I am aware of, and acknowledge, critiques of 
legal process theory by critical legal studies and public choice theorists, 
it is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to rebut these criticisms.4  
I assume that most of the descriptive and normative features of legal 
process theory are edifying and, therefore, helpful and pragmatic in 
delineating how a good American legislator should function. 
Despite numerous legislative bodies in the world and in the United 
States (indeed, there are thousands of legislatures if one tallies up all the 
county boards and city councils and special district government entities 
in the country), my focus in this article will be on a hypothetical member 
of the Congress of the United States, consisting, of course, of two 
bodies—the House of Representatives and the Senate—and, a 
hypothetical member of a state legislative body in the fifty American 
states (with every state but Nebraska—which has a unicameral 
legislature—having two houses).  Given the etymology of the word, 
legislator, which means a “proposer of law”—what the Oxford English 
Dictionary notes is “properly two words” derived from the Latin lex 
(law) and lator, used as an agent-noun to “bear, carry, bring.”5 I am 
interested in theorizing on what craft-characteristics and personal virtues 
epitomize a worthy state legislator or national legislator from the 
perspective of the laws that are proposed by the legislator and not the 
 
 2. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
 3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATIONS OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter HART & SACKS].  Permission granted from Foundation Press for 
extensive reference to this book, obtained November 29, 2004. 
 4. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) 
(providing an explanation and overview of the critical legal studies movement); Edward L. Rubin, 
The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1996) (explaining public choice theory criticisms of legal process). 
 5. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 810 (2d ed 1989). 
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political gamesmanship that, by necessity, comes with the job.  While 
the legal and the political unavoidably coalesce for a legislator, I want to 
emphasize the legal.  My undertaking here is exploratory, tentative and 
succinct.  My purpose, inspired by the extensive legal process literature 
that has tended to concentrate on judicial processes, is to offer some first 
thoughts on the importance of the “good” individual legislator in the 
healthy function of the American legal system as a whole. 
I shall proceed as follows.  In Part I of the Article, I will discuss the 
original legal process jurisprudence of the 1940s and 1950s, and will 
attempt to tease out of this body of thought concepts that bear on 
defining the good American legislator.6  In Part II, I turn, successively, 
to the three offshoots of the original legal process material, written over 
the last twenty years: process formalists, process progressives and 
process pragmatists.  I do this in order to uncover insights that might 
further our understanding of the good American legislator.7  In Part III, I 
offer some speculative musings on extending the good American 
legislator project into the future.8 
I.  FOUNDATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AND THE GOOD AMERICAN 
LEGISLATOR 
During the 1950s, Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. 
Sacks of Harvard Law School picked up the intellectual threads that had 
been spun by their Harvard colleague, Professor Lon L. Fuller, in his 
seminal 1949 article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers9, and 
weaved it, along with their own ideas, into the magisterial casebook 
entitled The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law.10  “Hart and Sacks’ intellectual starting point was 
the interconnectedness of human beings, and the usefulness of law in 
helping us coexist peacefully together.”11  By obvious implication, 
therefore, the concept of a good American legislator, a democratic 
representative interested in proposing and helping to fashion useful 
American laws, was part of the Hart and Sacks vision of peaceful 
coexistence. 
 
 6. See infra notes 9-207 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 208-67 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 268-309 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Fuller, supra note 2. 
 10. See HART & SACKS, supra note 3. 
 11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpretation of Statutes, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 200, 203 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
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A.  The Nature and Function of Law 
In chapter one of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks theorize that 
human conflict in the satisfaction of human wants is an inescapable 
feature of human interdependence.12  In resolving this inherent and 
systematic conflict, they contend that “affirmative and knowledgeable 
cooperation” through law, is necessary.13  Moreover, they observe that, 
in recognition of their fundamental interdependence with others, “people 
form themselves into groups for the protection and advancement of their 
common interests, or they accept membership in groups formed by 
others.”14  These groups establish “regular working,” that is, 
“institutionalized,  procedures for the settlement of questions of group 
concern.”15  Continuing their social theory, Hart and Sacks note that 
since “different procedures and personnel of different qualifications 
invariably prove to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of 
questions,”16 it follows “that every modern society differentiates among 
social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other 
modes for others—e.g., courts for ‘judicial’ decisions and legislatures 
for ‘legislative’ decisions.”17  They argue that implicit in America’s 
system of legal procedures is a bedrock principle, that of “institutional 
settlement.”18  This principle states that decisions which result from 
established “regularized and peaceable methods of decision . . . ought to 
 
 12. According to Hart and Sacks: 
[Americans] have a great variety of wants, ranging from the common urge to secure the 
simple necessities of physical existence to the most subtle of desires to achieve some 
sense of oneness with the universe.  The more basic wants are clearly apprehended and 
relatively fixed.  Others often are only dimly felt, and are subject to change by many 
complex processes both of external suggestion and of internal reflection.  But whatever 
for the time being each individual’s wants may be, human life is an unceasing process of 
fixing upon those on which time and effort are to be expended, and trying to satisfy 
them. 
HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 13. Id. at 2-3. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. at 360.  In this regard, Hart and Sacks make a useful distinction in chapter three of 
their book, between adjudicative facts and legislative facts: 
For many purposes it is useful to distinguish between adjudicative facts — namely, facts 
relevant in deciding whether a given general proposition is or is not applicable to a 
particular situation (that is, facts ordinarily, though not always, about what happened in 
the particular case) — and legislative facts — namely, facts relevant in deciding what 
general propositions should be recognized as authoritative (that is, facts, ordinarily, 
although not always, about what generally happens in a class of cases). 
Id. 
 18. Id. at 4. 
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be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are 
duly changed.”19  One of the corollaries of the principle of institutional 
settlement that Hart and Sacks posit has particular relevance to the 
concept of the good legislator: 
[T]he principle of institutional settlement operates not merely as a 
principle of necessity but as a principle of justice.  This means 
attention to the constant improvement of all of the procedures which 
depend upon the principle in the effort to assure that they yield 
decisions which are not merely preferable to the chaos of no decision 
but are calculated as well . . . to advance the larger purposes of 
society.20 
A legislator, acting as a cog in the overall legal system, is an 
official who must be particularly sensitive to demands for “generalized 
decision[s] as to how similar [social] problems are to be handled in the 
future.”21  In addition, as Hart and Sacks point out, a state legislator 
should be cognizant that he and his colleagues in the state legislature act 
“against the background of the common law, assumed to govern unless 
changed by [state] legislation,”22 just as a federal legislator should be 
aware that she and her colleagues in Congress build “upon legal 
relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only 
so far as necessary for . . . special purpose.”23  Yet, they warn that 
individual legislators, acting in concert in an “unthinking” and 
“unscientific” way, could over-react to social problems.24  For example, 
they might choose to vote in favor of criminalizing conduct like refusing 
to accept, pursuant to a contract, fresh fruit and produce in interstate 
commerce, when other, more nuanced and appropriate mechanisms of 
social ordering (like licensing, civil fines, and statutory contract rights) 
would be better legal tools under the circumstances.25  Conversely, Hart 
and Sacks discuss the worthy examples of individual federal legislators 
leading up to the passage of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. (citation omitted).  Yet, a federal legislator, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, must be further cognizant of (1) “the [d]omain of [e]xclusive 
[f]ederal [c]ompetence” — by virtue of matters that are specifically prohibited to the states — such 
as negotiating foreign treaties and making war, for example, and (2) the “[d]omain of [c]oncurrent 
[s]tate and [f]ederal [l]egislative [c]ompetence” that a federal legislator must keep abreast of and, if 
necessary, decide to occupy by exclusively federal laws.  HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 171-72. 
 24. Id. at 35. 
 25. Id. at 35-37. 
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Act of 193026—like Senator Borah of Idaho—who nimbly, adroitly, and 
persistently made changes in an antecedent bill that had not become 
law27 by doing “a great deal of knowledgeable legislative spade work 
among the various groups interested in the measure.”28  Indeed, Hart and 
Sacks portray the individual legislative efforts of Senator Borah as being 
emblematic of “one of the major features of American legislation—the 
extent to which the Legislature acts as a ratifying agency giving effect to 
agreements arrived at outside the legislature.”29 
A conscientious legislator, too, in the Hart and Sacks tradition, 
should care about: the constitutionality of legislation that he is 
considering;30 the impact of legislation in creating the need for a 
bureaucracy (entailing both budgetary and organizational issues) to carry 
out its purposes;31 the advisability of trying “to strike a happy medium 
between definiteness and indefiniteness” in the crafting of legislative 
commands within a statute;32 the need to appreciate the different “kinds 
of people to whom the directions” of a legislative command are 
directed—such as private persons, on the one hand, and government 
officials, on the other hand;33 and, the complex, practical differences 
(with particular social advantages and disadvantages) in fashioning 
statutory language34 between rules,35 standards,36 principles, and 
 
 26. Id. at 23-39. 
 27. Id. at 36-39. 
 28. Id. at 39. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 40 (discussing debate between Senators Borah and Wheeler over 
constitutionality of a bill that was to become the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930). 
 31. See, e.g., id. (discussing concerns by some members of Congress that the bill which 
became the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 “would create a huge federal 
bureaucracy.”).  Indeed, legislators “never can foresee all the questions” that arise from the 
enactment of a statute, and “one of the most basic questions of legislative policy and craftsmanship 
[is] . . . how far the enacting authority ought to try to anticipate all the questions and proliferate 
details.”  Id. at 127. 
 32. Id. at 117. 
 33. Id. at 118-19. 
 34. Id. at 138.  “General directions for the future may be of all degrees of definiteness and 
indefiniteness, depending upon what is possible and expedient.  There is an element of arbitrariness 
in any attempt to classify the directions according to their specificity.  But there may be utility also.”  
Id. 
 35. As Hart and Sacks explain: 
The most precise form of authoritative general direction may conveniently be called a 
rule, although the term is often used much more broadly to signify a legal proposition of 
any kind.  In the narrow and technical sense in which the term is here used, a rule may be 
defined as a legal direction which requires for its application nothing more than a 
determination of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events — that is, 
determination of fact.  An example would be [a] fifty-mile-an-hour speed statute . . . . 
  When a legal proposition functions successfully as a rule without the necessity of 
6
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policies.37  Yet, according to Hart and Sacks, a legislator must balance 
 
further elaboration, it needs . . . to be emphasized that some rather remarkable things 
have happened.  The kind of situation bringing the rule into play has been accurately 
foreseen, and public policy with respect to it fully determined in advance.  The rule has 
been successfully communicated to one or another of its addressees, and the addressee 
has properly identified the facts calling for its application.  If the rule was complied with 
by the primary addressee, he has not only recognized its content and applicability but has 
shown a willingness to comply with it.  If the rule was enforced by a judicial tribunal, its 
claim to acceptance as law has been officially confirmed under the most testing of all 
circumstances — in the light of the perspective of application to a concrete situation. 
Id. at 139. 
 36. Hart and Sacks contend that: 
Many legal arrangements cannot feasibly be cast in the form of a rule . . . .  And often 
another form is deliberately chosen as preferable.  Thus, a state may give over the effort 
to fix any single definite maximum speed on its highways, and return to the idea of the 
common law that no person should drive “at an unreasonable rate of speed.”  This 
provision is of the type commonly known as a standard. 
  Unlike a rule, the application of a standard requires something more than a 
determination merely of the happening or non-happening of physical events.  It requires 
a comparison of the quality or tendency of what happened in the particular instance with 
what is believed to be the quality or tendency of happenings in like situations.  A 
standard may be defined broadly as a legal direction which can be applied only by 
making, in addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular 
situation, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable 
consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general human experience. 
Id. at 140. 
 37. As Hart and Sacks explain: 
The great bulk of legal arrangements which speak directly to ordinary private citizens, 
telling them what they can, may, or must do, or not do, and what happens if they act 
differently, are in the form of rules, inchoate or perfected, and standards.  So also are 
many of the arrangements which speak in the first instance to officials.  But these two 
forms are far from comprising the whole framework of legal arrangements in an 
organized society.  Notably to be contrasted with rules and standards are principles and 
policies. 
  Principles and policies are closely related, and for many purposes need not be 
distinguished from each other.  A policy is simply a statement of objective.  E.g., full 
employment, the promotion of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, 
national security, conservation of natural resources, etc. . . .  A principle also describes a 
result to be achieved.  But it differs in that it asserts that the result ought to be achieved 
and includes, either expressly or by reference to well-understood bodies of thought, a 
statement of the reasons why it should be achieved.  E.g., pacta sunt servanda — 
agreements should be observed; no person should be unjustly enriched; etc. . . . 
  Policies usually have reasons behind them, but they are likely to be less closely 
thought out and justified.  At least in the extremes and for some purposes, there seems to 
be a significant difference between a mere statement of objective, which may be a matter 
of unreasoned preference, and a statement that a certain objective ought to be sought or a 
certain course of action followed, which necessarily involves a rationale founded on 
human experience of why this is so. 
  Principles and policies, like rules and standards, are general directive propositions, 
or elements of them.  But unlike rules and standards they are not expressed in terms of 
the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events or of qualitative appraisals 
of such happenings drawn from human experience.  They are on a much higher level of 
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her desire for perfect rational order and consistency in lawmaking 
against the paralysis which would occur if she “sought to develop an 
articulated and avowedly governing body of subsidiary principles and 
policies and implementing rules and standards” which would inform her 
how to vote on particular bills.38  A good legislator, in facing personal 
doubt and uncertainty about the wisdom of voting in favor of a particular 
statutory rule or standard to be implemented by agency officials might, 
for example, deftly support expansive powers of administrative and 
judicial review along with extensive statutory “arrangements which 
prescribe the procedure to be followed [by the agency officials] in 
exercising the power; the information which must be secured; the people 
whose views must be listened to; the findings and justifications of the 
decision which must be made . . . [and other] formal requisites of action 
which must be observed.”39  In general, Hart and Sacks suggest that an 
individual legislator be aware of the traditions of her legislative body;40 
be conversant in budgetary and tax matters needed for the “primary, 
first-line responsibility” of funding and maintaining government and 
quasi-governmental institutions necessary for the flourishing of the 
state;41 be of the mind to intermittently intervene in changing or 
modifying key judicial decisions, when necessary, while being willing to 
engage in “trouble-shooting” in private social arrangements when called 
for, giving due deference to private parties, courts, and administrative 
agencies as the “primary, front-line” source of laws.42 
 
abstraction, and obviously involve a vastly larger postponement of decision.  A policy 
leaves to the addressee the entire job of figuring out how the stated objective is to be 
achieved, save only as the policy may be limited by rules and standards which mark the 
outer bounds of permissible choice.  A principle gives the addressee only the additional 
help of a reason for what he is to try to do. 
Id. at 141-42. 
 38. Id. at 153. 
 39. Id. at 153-54. 
 40. Id. at 157. 
 41. Id. at 164. 
 42. Id.  Hart and Sacks describe this general legislative attitude as “discretion.”  Id. at 165.  
“For a legislature is in session only intermittently.  The number of problems within its authority 
vastly exceed the number with which in any one session it has time to grapple.  A choice of the 
matters deemed most urgent must, therefore, be made.”  Id.  Moreover, in the exercise of this 
discretion, legislators do the following: 
[L]egislators make two very distinct types of changes in the law governing private 
activity.  The first type consists simply of changes in the grounds of decision that courts 
are directed to employ — of changes in other words, in the content of self-applying 
regulatory arrangements.  The second consists of innovations in techniques of control 
going beyond the mere reformulation of grounds of decision. 
Id. 
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B.  Lawmaking and the Political Process 
In chapter four of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks hint at how an 
individual state legislator in America must be aware of the interplay of 
initiatives and referenda as legal devices of direct popular lawmaking 
that often interact with a state legislature in making new laws.43  
Furthermore, in this part of their book, Hart and Sacks discuss the 
concepts of legislative reapportionment and election procedure that are 
relevant for both state and federal legislators to be aware of in navigating 
their individual efforts at re-election.44 
At the end of chapter four, in a concluding “Note on the Relation 
Between the Voters’ Choice and the Determination of Public Policy By 
the Legislature,” Hart and Sacks make a number of significant points on 
what American voters can expect from their elected legislators. 45 First, 
reflecting on the American constitutional conception “that approximate 
equality in voting population ought to be taken as the overriding norm of 
fairness in legislative districting,”46 the authors intellectually anchored 
this notion to the philosophical presupposition of “the legislature as the 
embodiment of the public will which ought . . . to reflect accurately the 
various attitudes and interests that people have.”47  Hart and Sacks 
suggest that this constitutes a “basic misconception of the nature of the 
lawmaking process[.]”48  Asking a series of rhetorical questions to 
follow up this point, they assert: 
Are good statutes simply a reflection of what people already think? 
Compare the notion . . . that the people can make good laws by simply 
voting initiative petitions up or down.  The legislature is an instrument, 
is it not, for arriving at general consensus and not an automatic Gallup 
poll for recording a consensus already arrived at?49 
 
 43. Id. at 649-70.  While a federal legislator is not subject to a national referendum or 
initiative to challenge his legislative work product, since the federal Constitution, unlike the 
constitutions of the several states, lacks any procedure for initiative or referendum, a federal 
legislator representing a state with an initiative or referendum procedure set forth in the state 
constitution should probably be concerned about direct popular lawmaking. 
 44. Id. at 670-86. 
 45. Id. at 687-91. 
 46. Id. at 687. 
 47. Id.  In this regard, Hart and Sacks observe, “[c]ompare the traditional conception of 
French public law that the legislature is an ‘emanation’ from the people, and, indeed the legal 
equivalent of the people themselves.  ‘The law (loi) is the general will, expressed either by the 
majority of citizens or a majority of their representatives.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (citing FR. CONST. 
art VI). 
       48.  Id. 
 49. Id. 
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A second observation Hart and Sacks make on voter preference and 
legislator lawmaking is that in the American system of legislative 
voting, where the executive is independently elected to a fixed term of 
office and individual legislators are, likewise, independently elected to 
fixed terms of office, “majorities are more likely to be shifting ones than 
in the parliamentary systems.”50  Therefore: 
The summoning of a majority for legislative action—whether it be a 
continuing majority to support a government, a more or less stable 
majority to try to execute a party program, or a constantly shifting 
majority to enact a series of bills—calls necessarily for 
accommodation of conflicting views.  The ways in which the effort at 
accommodation proceeds is of the essence of the legislative process.51 
Third, in legislative elections, each voter may only vote for one 
candidate.52  Since the successful candidate will identify himself with a 
particular measure, “the vote for him will to a degree be a vote for or 
against these measures.”53  However, “the significance of the vote in this 
respect is necessarily severely limited”54 for at least three reasons.  First, 
“the legislator, no matter how fully he has adumbrated his views as a 
candidate, can seldom be sure that the majority or plurality of the voters 
who elected him represent also a majority or plurality of opinion for or 
against any particular measure.”55  Secondly, “the voter can at most only 
express an opinion for or against the general policy of a proposed 
measure.  [However, t]he practicalities of a campaign debar any 
meaningful discussion of the details of legislative proposals, even when 
these are of crucial importance and it is foreseeable that they are 
important.”56  Finally, a legislator who is affiliated with one of the two 
 
 50. Id. at 688. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  As Hart and Sacks further elaborate: 
In the case of major issues which dominated the campaign, this may not be true.  But in 
the case of most of the issues upon which the legislator must vote it will necessarily be 
true.  All that any voter could do in the ballot box was to express a judgment on the 
totality of a candidate’s views and personal qualities — thumbs up or thumbs down.  
Personal qualities and not specific views at all may have determined the outcome of the 
election.  But even if it be assumed that views were controlling, if the issues were many, 
as they ordinarily are, the number of possible combinations that could have yielded a 
favorable vote is so great as to make it either difficult or impossible to determine what 
the vote was on any particular issue. 
Id. at 688-89. 
 56. Id. at 689.  Moreover: 
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major American political parties must accommodate his views on 
particular issues to the party program or platform which “must be 
designed to secure approval and support from a majority of the 
electorate as a whole for the government in power.”57  Thus, “there must 
be negotiation and accommodation of interests and desires among the 
representatives of many groups, economic, social, and geographical.”58  
In concluding their thoughts on lawmaking and the political process in 
chapter three of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks offer a series of 
incisive and powerful questions about the relationship between the 
electorate and each voter’s individual legislator in the making of law: 
In relation to how many . . . proposals [for legislative enactment] can 
useful guidance from the last election be counted upon? 
In relation to how many would the details of bills and the final 
question of enactment vel non be better left to ministerial decision in 
fulfillment of previous commitments to the electorate? 
In relation to how many is there genuine value in investigation, 
committee hearing and consultation, and floor debate by legislators 
who remain relatively free to vote yes or vote no? 
On balance, how significantly can an election function as a first step in 
 
The voter is even more clearly excluded from judgment with respect to those matters 
which emerge as important only in the course of legislative consideration and debate.  
What positions must be yielded in order to muster the necessary majority to pass the 
bill?  What positions ought to be yielded because in the testing crucible of the legislative 
process they have been exposed as unsound?  At what point do changes in detail call for 
a change of view about the underlying policy of the bill?  Upon all such questions the 
voter in the end must trust the judgment of the representative.  So also must he do this 
with respect to social problems arising after the election, which were not discussed in the 
campaign at all. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  Interestingly: 
In this process of hammering out a comprehensive legislative program, the constituents 
of an independent legislator have the advantage, if it is an advantage, of being 
represented by a free lance, able to throw his weight one way or another as the 
expediencies seem to suggest.  But this advantage is gained at the cost of any 
opportunity to judge in advance, or give direction to, the alignments which the 
representative makes. 
  A prime function of political parties is to furnish the voters this opportunity.  The 
platform of a political party presents them with a pre-election plan of group action, 
including a preview of the accommodations of position among the various sub-groups 
which are deemed necessary to effectuate it. 
Id. 
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the formation of public policy?  Are not the people inescapably 
dependent upon the good faith and judgment with which, after due 
deliberation and due attention to current opinion in the constituency, 
their representatives act?  Is not the election, then, significant chiefly 
as an after check, to encourage the exercise of good faith and judgment 
and discourage abuses?59 
C.   Legislators and the Legislative Process 
In chapter five of their book, Professors Hart and Sacks create a 
treasure trove of material which, when carefully sifted, is relevant to the 
responsibilities and roles of the good American legislator.60  Chapter five 
consists of five major sections: (1) an introduction on the function of a 
legislature; (2) a discussion of codification and the revision of decisional 
law; (3) an appraisal of distinctively legislative techniques to control 
private conduct; (4) a review of some special problems of enforcement; 
and (5) a proposed but incomplete discussion of legislative 
investigations and other non-enactment functions.61  Of particular 
interest to the topic of the good American legislator are materials in 
chapter five which take a synoptical look at how an individual legislator 
fits into the institutional structure of a modern legislature, and which 
discuss a legislator’s toolbox for controlling private conduct.62 
1.  A Synoptical Look at How An Individual Legislator Fits Into 
the Institutional Structure of a Modern Legislature. 
In the first section of their chapter on the legislative process, 
coupled with a brief prefatory note, Hart and Sacks pose two 
overarching questions which an individual legislator might well be 
interested in answering concerning concrete issues that could 
conceivably come to his attention.  The first big question is: “[u]nder 
what circumstances is it wise for the legislature to seek to solve an 
admitted problem by formal enactment?”63  The second mega-question 
is: “[b]y what criteria, if any, may we conclude that a particular 
 
 59. Id. at 691. 
 60. Id. at 693-1007. 
 61. Id.  Because their book was always a work-in-progress, Hart and Sacks left bracketed 
certain sections for later revision.  For example, they never completed section five of chapter five 
dealing with legislative investigations and other non-enactment functions.  See id. at 1007. 
 62. Id. at 693-1007. 
 63. Id. at 693 (emphasis added). 
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enactment is sound or unsound?”64  The authors, in offering a 
preliminary analysis of these large inquiries focus our attention on the 
institutional potential of a legislative body—what they refer to as “the 
overall potential of the legislature as an operating institution” entailing 
“the total work it must perform and the organizational structure and 
procedures through which it performs that work.”65  In addition, they 
make a number of exploratory points about how a good legislator might 
judge a proposed legislative measure as being good or bad.66  Some of 
these inchoate observations include the following: 
[T]o what extent the legislature should in any given case seek to 
elaborate the statute, leaving a minimum of decision to the future, and 
to what extent it should leave the elaboration of the statute to other 
institutions (e.g., private persons, prosecutors, courts, and 
administrative agencies)?67 
Consider whether the legislature has selected the best technique of 
enforcement from among those available.68 
Consider whether a given statute seeks to control conduct beyond the 
limits of effective legal action.69 
Consider whether the best criterion of sound legislation is the test of 
whether it is the product of a sound process of enactment.70 
 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 694-95. 
 67. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).  “Here we have the fundamental issue of the use of general 
versus the use of specific language in statutes.”  Id. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added).  “Can a body of dependable knowledge be built up concerning the 
workings of various types of sanctions?”  Id. at 694-95. 
 69. Id. at 695 (emphasis added).  “Is it possible to indicate at least in general terms, the outer 
bounds of wise and effective legal control?”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. (emphasis added).  Hart and Sacks elaborate on this point as follows: 
All will probably agree that procedure is a relevant consideration.  There is less 
agreement about the elements of a sound process. 
  There is general agreement that the legislative process should strive to achieve 
certain qualities.  Thus, it ought to be an informed process, in the sense that key 
decisions are not made until relevant information has been acquired.  It ought to be a 
deliberative process, in the sense that key decisions are not made until there has been a 
full interchange of views and arguments among those making the decisions.  And it 
ought to be an efficient process, in the sense that all legislative proposals ought to be 
disposed of in the time available, with more significant ones receiving proportionately 
more time.  Note that the needs of efficiency may interfere with the ideals of information 
and deliberation. 
Id. 
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To what extent should the legislative process be a rational process, 
whereby policy judgments and factual information become the basis of 
carefully reasoned solutions; and to what extent ought the process 
rather to reflect the relative strengths of the pressures of competing 
interest groups?71 
To what extent should the [individual] legislator feel responsibility to 
initiate legislation on his own; and to what extent is his function rather 
to review proposals made by others?72 
Ought the legislative process to be so constructed that the views of a 
majority can easily be translated into law; or is it desirable that there 
be means whereby a minority can obstruct action on matters upon 
which it feels especially strongly, at least until the majority becomes 
equally impassioned?73 
After these intriguing introductory queries, Hart and Sacks 
articulate a central organizing principle for understanding the business of 
an American legislature.74   They boldly contend, in this regard, that “[i]f, 
as is true of every legislature in the United States, the size of [the 
legislative] workload is such that no individual legislator can possibly 
obtain an understanding of each bill that must be disposed of, then the 
ideals of an informed and deliberative process take on a new meaning.”75  
Related to this key principle, the authors highlight an issue which is 
critical to the conception of a legal system consisting of multiple legal 
processes, meshing with one another and helping to contribute to a 
whole which is greater than the sum of its individual parts: “the great 
problem of the appropriate division of responsibility between courts and 
[the] legislature in the creative development of law.”76 
In introducing the “[m]ajor [t]asks”77 of an American state or 
federal legislative body—and by implication, the matters that a serious 
legislator should care about—Hart and Sacks discuss five major 
legislative functions: (a) organizing, supervising and improving the 
 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. (emphasis added).  “Bearing on this is the identification of persons and groups from 
whom legislative proposals can be expected.”  Id. 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. at 696. 
 75. Id.  “We can better appraise, for example, the need for delegating legislative functions 
through a committee system and for legislating virtually by common consent.  We can better 
understand the potentialities and limitations of floor debate and the problems of legislative 
leadership.”  Id. 
 76. Id. at 697 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. 
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entire governmental structure and procedures of government;78 (b) 
managing the public purse (a task that should be on the “top” of a 
legislator’s commitment of her “time and energy”),79 (c) promulgation, 
review, and modification of general laws affecting private individuals 
and institutions80 (such as regulation by government administrative 
officials, “new, self-applying statutes” and grants or entitlements to 
government services and benefits as well as general responsibility for 
updating and improving legal doctrine);81 (d) consideration of private 
 
 78. Id.  The authors point out, in this regard, that where constitutional law “leaves off in the 
assignment of official powers, the legislature must move in and complete the job, either by making 
the assignments itself or by delegating the authority to do so to some other agency.”  Id.  Moreover, 
“[t]he job is never complete” and “[a]s government encounters new problems and needs, additional 
or at least new units must be constructed.”  Id.  Writing from the perspective of the late 1950s, the 
authors suggest that a “dramatic . . .  example is the establishment of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Agency [Administration (NASA)].”  Id.  An early twenty-first century example would be the 
Department of Homeland Security formed by Congress in the aftermath of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.  Government housekeeping is part of the legislative function since “[t]here must be 
provision for the hiring of personnel and fixing of salaries, the building or purchase of buildings in 
which to house them, the acquisition of an endless variety of supplies” and other such tedious 
matters.  Id. at 698.  If some of these matters are delegated to administrative officials of the 
executive branch of government, the “legislature must discharge its ultimate responsibilities by 
setting standards for the administrator[s] to follow” and also be concerned about checking and 
balancing the power delegated to other officials.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 698. 
Prime responsibility for public finance rests with the legislature, on the side both of 
revenue and expenditure.  Taxes must be authorized by statute, and public borrowing 
also.  In the usual constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the public 
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation authorized by law fixes legislative 
responsibility for expenditures.  The discharge of this function requires periodic scrutiny 
of the whole range of governmental activity and judgment upon its justification and 
extent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id.  The authors argue: 
This area of responsibility involves the formulation of techniques of control which only 
the legislature can initiate or authorize.  It covers every kind of social problem, small or 
large, with respect to which a change is proposed which cannot be accomplished by the 
characteristic judicial method of elaborating and announcing reasoned grounds of 
decision. 
Id.  Thus, these distinctive legislative techniques of social control “include such regulatory 
techniques as the self-applying law to be enforced by criminal sanctions as well as all the varieties 
of administered regulation, such as licensing.  They also encompass many non-regulatory measures, 
including the provision of governmental services.”  Id.  The authors asked the reader to “consider” 
federal as well as state “legislative effort that must go into the provision of education, roads and 
highways, protective services, and the like.”  Id. 
 81. Id. at 699-700, 703-04.  Legislative responsibility for legal doctrine is twofold, entailing, 
first, codification of particular aspects of unwritten, judge-made law in conjunction with “periodic 
general revision of statutory law” already on the books (amounting “merely to an improvement in 
the mechanical organization of statutory sections, paragraphs, and clauses, or . . .  the thoughtful and 
creative revision of the [statutory] law in light of experience”), id. at 699, and second, “repair and 
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and special legislation to deal with isolated problems, measures of local 
application or other relatively trivial concerns;82 and (e) various non-
enactment jobs like investigations, confirmations of executive nominees 
for public offices, impeachment proceedings and matters of legislative 
housekeeping (such as revising chamber rules of procedure).83  In 
addition, Hart and Sacks leaven the description of the institutional 
responsibilities of a modern American legislature with perceptive 
insights on how these tasks might impact and overlap with the 
challenges facing an individual legislator.84  For instance, the authors 
observe the hard reality that, as arduous as the challenges may be, a 
legislator must work hard “to secure nomination and election and to 
keep political fences in order in the interim between campaigns.”85  A 
legislator must master the delicate complexities of acting as an 
“intermediary between constituents and the numerous branches of the 
executive department with which she has to deal.”86  Additionally, a 
legislator must decide how ambitious she wants to be in pursuing the 
tasks of codification and law revision, and how content she is “to rely on 
committees and staffs of experts and technicians.”87 
 
modification of legal doctrine” as elaborated by the courts or agencies, on the one hand, or 
outmoded statutes on the other.  Id. at 699-700. 
 82. Id. at 701.  Indeed: 
Among the responsibilities assumed by most legislatures is that of decision about a vast 
mass of particular matters, embodied in special acts of various kinds.  In many states, 
legislatures continue to dispose of great numbers of individual claims against the state 
government by private acts.  Various kinds of public benefits are dispersed by the same 
method.  Some legislatures, also, are heavily preoccupied with measures of purely local 
application, involving decisions which in other states are delegated to political 
subdivisions. 
Id.  The individual who aspires to be a good legislator should take careful note of the costs and 
benefits of becoming too heavily involved in these relatively unimportant matters.  Hart and Sacks 
observe, in this regard: 
One of the major planks in almost every program of reform of legislative processes is the 
elimination of these trivia by appropriate delegation to courts and executive and 
administrative agencies.  But meanwhile the pressure of these obligations limits sharply 
the time and energy available for larger problems. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 701-02. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 702. 
 86. Id.  (“How to make this job [of being an intermediary] manageable, and to do it both 
helpfully and without improper interference with executive activities, is one of the foremost 
problems confronting legislators.”). 
 87. Id. at 699. 
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2.  A Legislator’s Toolbox for Controlling Private Conduct 
What methods, what procedures, what incentives and disincentives 
can the good legislator deploy in achieving the worthy public goals of 
educational achievement, environmental protection, economic security 
and the like that she seeks for her constituents?  Hart and Sacks provide 
a panoply of insights and comments in describing the legislator’s toolkit, 
which consists of five major kinds of tools and multiple specialized 
instruments of social control within those groupings.  The five major 
kinds of tools consist of: (a) private autonomy with government taking a 
hands-off approach; (b) governmental regulation; (c) direct coercion; (d) 
government inducement; and (e) direct government involvement.88 
a.  Private Autonomy and the Method of Government Hands-
off89 
Incorporating their extensive discussion earlier in The Legal 
Process on the importance of “autonomous private ordering” to a 
healthy legal order,90 the authors point out that this laissez-faire 
technique of governmental non-control is, actually, a tool “open to a 
 
 88. See id. at 844-63. 
 89. Id. at 845. 
 90. Id.  In earlier chapters of their book, Hart and Sacks portray what they call “[t]he 
[i]nterplay of [p]rivate and [o]ffical [p]rocedures for [d]ecision.”  Id. at 6.  They address this issue at 
the beginning of their work: 
The procedures of decision of questions of group concern which are most readily thought 
of as institutionalized, or regularized, are those which are manned by officials — that is, 
by individuals designated to act and acting, formally and avowedly, in behalf of the 
society.  Among these are the procedures of public prosecution, of judicial decision, of 
legislative enactment, of executive and administrative action, and the like — together 
with the procedure of public education in which . . . the voter acts in an essentially 
official capacity. . . . 
  Not every question of group concern, however, can be decided by officials, and 
certainly not every such question in the first instance.  Every society necessarily assigns 
many kinds of questions to private decision, and then backs up the private decision, if it 
has been duly made, when and if it is challenged before officials.  Thus, private persons 
are empowered by observance of a prescribed procedure, to oblige themselves to carry 
out certain contractual undertakings, and, if dispute arises, to settle their differences for 
themselves.  So may a host of other matters be settled which are immediately of private, 
but potentially of public, concern.  In a genuine sense, these procedures of private 
decision, too, become institutionalized.  An understanding of how they work is vital to 
an understanding of the institutional system as a whole. 
Id. at 6-7.  See also id. at 9-10 (discussing, by way of introduction, two classic Hart and Sacks 
“problems” that illustrate how private ordering interacts with public expectations and values); id. at 
183-339 (discussing, in general, the role of private ordering and some of its problems and, more 
specifically, private ordering arrangements of “primary activity” and “remedial activity.”); id. at 
132-33 (detailing principles and methods of autonomous private ordering). 
17
Blomquist: The Good American Legislator
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
912 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:895 
legislature.”91  Moreover, they contend that “it will often happen, when  
the status quo” governing a particular public policy issue “is one of 
control, that the legislature is the only institution empowered to remove 
the control”92—as, for example, de-regulating a particular problem like 
entry and rates of trucking firms in interstate or intrastate commerce. 
b.  The Method of Governmental Regulation93 
Hart and Sacks divide the legislative technique of governmental 
regulation into two subdivisions: (1) self-applying regulation, and (2) 
individualized regulation.94  They observe that while there are certain 
advantages to self-applying regulation—such as decentralized control 
and low enforcement expenditures—“severe limitations” exist in the 
“looseness” of its nature.95  The authors offer an apt illustration of these 
limitations: “If society is really in earnest about having its doctors 
competent . . . it is hardly likely to trust to a general definition of 
competence, coupled with a prohibition against practicing medicine 
unless you can satisfy it, to be applied by the would-be doctors 
themselves, subject only to an aftercheck.”96  Thus, “[i]n this and many 
other situations, what is felt to be needed is an individualized, case-by-
case application by officials.”97  The authors articulate five specific types 
of individualized regulatory tools. 
(1)  Prerequisites.  This technique is, at its heart, “a prior check” 
that “tells people to have some kind of dealings with an official before 
going ahead to do what they want to do.”98  Thus, “[t]he effect of 
satisfying the preliminary requirement may be to create a liberty to 
follow a proposed course of action, or to confer a power to effectuate a 
proposed transaction, or both.”99 
Prerequisites help achieve “preventative justice” for a number of 
reasons.100  First, such a technique—as, for example, registering an 
automobile for a fee—may help ensure the collection of revenue up 
 
 91. Id. at 845. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 846. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 847. 
 99. Id. (“Prerequisites always have a self-applying aspect.  ‘Do not do this kind of thing 
without a license, or you will be subject to a penalty.’  ‘If you want to accomplish this kind of legal 
result, you must first get official approval, or you will encounter the sanction of nullity.’”). 
 100. Id. at 848. 
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front, without the need to result to cumbersome collection procedures.101  
Second, revocation of a license allows the possibility of “an additional 
and often uniquely effective sanction for violation.”102  Third, an 
advance need for official approval fosters the ability to “scrutinize 
proposed transactions or activities in advance, in order to see whether 
they should be authorized.”103  Fourth, “[a]dvance permission is useful, 
too, to prevent things from being done which would be hard to undo, if 
they turned out to be undesirable,” like constructing a pier in a harbor, or 
erecting a multi-story office building in a mixed commercial-residential 
part of town.104  Fifth, the tool of prerequisites helps the government, 
when it decides that it is socially appropriate and necessary, to protect 
scarce resources (such as preserving the water quality of a lake by 
requiring permits to discharge pollutants), or to encourage coordinated, 
efficient economic infrastructure (such as deciding to create quasi-
monopolistic public utilities under private ownership).105 
Hart and Sacks provide a useful suggestion to the good American 
legislator in conducting what they described as “a systematic review of 
the state and federal statute books designed to weed out the prior checks 
which are unjustifiable and to simplify and expedite the administration 
of the others.”106 
(2)  Postrequisites.  Another special tool of individualized 
regulation is the use of postrequisites, which offer the advantage of 
relieving individuals and associations of obtaining advance official 
approval.107  A “postrequisite is a requirement that [someone], after 
rather than before doing a certain act, file a report, or do something else 
calling for official attention, as a condition of validity of the primary 
act.”108 
The effect of a postrequisite “may be to validate an attempted 
exercise of a legal power.”109  Alternatively, “it may be to relieve the 
actor from the consequences of what otherwise would be a breach of 
duty—in effect creating after the event a liberty.”110  Recording statutes 
for real estate transactions and reporting requirements for certain 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 849. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 850. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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businesses—like hazardous chemical production reports—are 
illustrations of regulatory postrequisites.111 
(3)  Individualized Dissolution and Readjustment of Legal 
Relations.  “Closely related to the prerequisite . . . are those 
arrangements which authorize important alterations in a preexisting legal 
status or position but require an individualized approval as a condition of 
it.”112  Prominent examples of this legislative tool include statutes 
requiring judicial approval before divorces are granted, aliens are 
naturalized as American citizens, or the debts of individuals or 
businesses are discharged or modified by way of bankruptcy.113 
As a matter of public policy, this legislative tool should be reserved 
for serious changes in existing social arrangements where “the interests 
of other individuals are so seriously affected as to require a formal 
hearing and determination.”114  This technique is also appropriate to 
address “dispensations from general law” when a genuine hardship or 
fundamental public reason justifies the exceptional treatment.115  Zoning 
variance laws or statutes providing for exceptions for certain 
environmental regulations are examples of this regulatory tool.  Of 
course, one needs to be aware that “[s]uch dispensations . . . are rare in 
the American legal system” because of “dangers of unfair preference, as 
well as the difficulties of [evenhanded] administration.”116 
(4)  Individual Directions.  A legislative tool that allows scrutiny of 
compliance with various laws by individuals or firms consists of 
delegating authority to a public official to supervise and, if needed, 
sanction members of the regulated community.117  Such a legislative 
approach can be as simple as empowering a police officer to stop 
speeding automobiles and issue traffic tickets, or as complicated as 
ceding discretionary authority to an administrative agency to issue cease 
and desist orders for violations of consumer protection laws or labor 
laws.  Use of the technique of individual directions, however, should 
usually be accompanied by careful directions of fair procedures of 
notice, hearing and judicial review.118 
(5)  Exactions.  “An exaction is a requirement of rendering a 
described, affirmative performance to the government, in money, 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 851. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 851-53. 
 118. Id. at 852. 
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services, or property.”119  Although “highly exceptional in American 
law,”120 the technique is “of the highest importance in the few situations 
in which it is used.”121  Taxation, military conscription, jury duty and the 
obligation to give testimony are all significant exactions.122 
c.  The Method of Direct Coercion123 
On occasion, a legislator may conclude that techniques of direct 
coercion are called for in enforcing the law.  Examples of this approach 
include official confiscation and destruction of private property deemed 
to be dangerous to public health, prohibiting certain classes of aliens 
from entering the country, and deporting certain aliens for various 
reasons.124 
d.  The Method of Inducement125 
As Hart and Sacks opine, “in pursuit of the ultimate goal of 
maximizing the satisfactions of valid human wants, the law finds many a 
tool besides force that suits its purpose.”126  Hart and Sacks focused on 
three specific methods of inducement: persuasion, rewards, and 
government contracts. 
(1) Persuasion.  “At the opposite extreme from direction coercion 
are the seemingly gentle processes of persuasion and appeal to public 
opinion.”127 The good legislator not only will vote for legislative 
proposals that authorize programs by administrative officials which rely 
on persuasive features—such as information brochures, television and 
radio public service announcements, and the like—but will also seek his 
own ways to communicate with constituents and urge public-spirited 
behavior. 
(2) Pecuniary or Other Rewards.  Hart and Sacks point out: “[a]s in 
the government of a family so in that of society, a reward may be more 
effective than either persuasion or command in inducing desired 
conduct.”128  Drawing upon American history to illustrate instances of 
 
 119. Id. at 853. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 854. 
 125. Id. at 855. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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enlightened federal legislative rewards which helped to achieve the 
purposes of expanding the Nation and stabilizing the economy, the 
authors observed: 
The United States could scarcely have populated the Great West by 
telling people they were under a duty to settle there.  But the promise 
of a homestead proved effective.  Grants of mining patents have 
similarly encouraged prospecting for minerals on the public lands.  
Farmers are notoriously recalcitrant when any outsider tries to tell 
them how to farm.  Whether the United States would have 
constitutional power to compel farmers to adopt better practices for 
conservation of the soil is highly doubtful, but no such undertaking 
would have been practicable in any case.  The device of subsidy paid 
upon condition of an agreement to observed stipulated practice, 
however, has been accepted and has been measurably successful.  In 
recent years the subsidy has been employed in a wide variety of other 
fields, and has come to loom as a more and more formidable 
instrument of government policy.129 
(3)  Bilateral Government Contracts.  In structuring programs by 
legislation, the good legislator should be aware that government 
contracts can serve as vital tools of “governmental housekeeping” as 
well as “instruments of conscious control of primary private activity.”130  
Thus, the government can often “secure results more readily by contract 
than [it] could [obtain] by regulation,” due to the obligor’s personal 
agreement to meet negotiated contract terms such as prevailing wages, 
fair and equitable hiring practices, and non-discriminatory employment 
practices.131  Moreover, “[t]he government contract, as a device for 
controlling private conduct, has its own distinctive sanction of the 
withholding of payment, or of future agreement,” which “lends itself 
readily to individualization in the light of the particular circumstances of 
each contractor.”132 
e.  The Method of Direct Government Action133 
Hart and Sacks, drawing, in part, on Hart’s experience as a 
 
 129. Id. at 855-56.  Hart and Sacks contend, in this regard, that “[i]n substance, the patent and 
copyright laws proceed upon the same principle” by rewarding creative persons with “a specially 
declared duty of other people, for a limited period of time, not to appropriate without permission the 
results of [a] writing or invention.”  Id. at 856. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 857. 
 133. Id. 
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government lawyer during the New Deal,134 articulate another option 
available to legislators who contemplate the sound crafting of 
government programs.  “In lieu of telling private persons what to do — 
by regulation, direct coercion, or attempted inducement of desired 
conduct — the government has always the alternative of doing the thing 
itself.”135  Therefore, a legislator may decide that government should, for 
example, “build the bridge, run the postal service or school system, 
conduct the research, or own and operate the atomic pile.”136  
Accordingly, “[i]nstead of trying to create the conditions under which 
the people can help themselves, in other words, it may provide them 
with direct assistance.”137 
The authors discuss, in considerable detail, eight specific 
techniques of direct government action which, in theory, “may be used 
in aid of private ordering as well as displacement of it” such that 
“properly used, are means of enhancing the practical abilities of some 
people and restricting those of others in such a way as to make for a 
fairer and more effective interplay of abilities among the members of the 
society generally.”138  These eight specific techniques of direct 
government action consist of the following: (1) public education,139 (2) 
information and publicity,140 (3) research services,141 (4) protective 
services,142 (5) public works,143 (6) donations,144 (7) governmental 
 
 134. See e.g., id. at lxxviii (discussing Hart’s government experience). 
 135. Id. at 857 (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 858.  Hart and Sacks opine that “[p]erhaps the most telling example of a socially 
useful government service is public education.  Here the government adds directly to the stock of 
society’s principal resource: the socially beneficial abilities of human beings.”  Id.  Educational 
services provided by the government run “from the cradle to the grave” including “nursery schools 
through kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools, trade schools, colleges and universities, 
to extension services” and public libraries.  Id. 
 140. Id.  Examples of governmentally-provided information and publicity include the decennial 
national census-taking, weather business data and crop forecasts.  Id. at 858-59. 
 141. Id. at 859. 
 142. Id.  According to Hart and Sacks: 
The government offers protection to people against a great variety of hazards, both 
natural and man made.  These include most conspicuously the service of national 
defense and the domestic service of police protection.  These include also protection 
against the natural forces of fire, flood, drought and storm.  They include the protection 
of plants and animals against pests and disease.  They include manifold forms of 
protection of human beings against the occurrence of accident or disease and against its 
consequences.  Hospital services of various kinds seem properly to be included in this 
category. 
Id. at 859-60. 
 143. Id. at 860. 
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assurance,145 and (8) governmental enterprises.146 
D.  Miscellaneous Wisdom for the Good Legislator 
Throughout The Legal Process, Professors Hart and Sacks make 
comments and observations that are instructive for the good legislator.  
These miscellaneous points can be usefully grouped into four categories: 
(1) private ordering perspectives for legislators, (2) legislative 
interactions with courts, (3) legislative interplay with administrative 
agencies, and (4) the responsibility of the legislature in the interpretation 
of statutes. 
1.  Private Ordering Perspectives for Legislators 
A perspicacious legislator should know that, in the overall 
architecture of the American legal system, private decisionmakers—
often assisted by their lawyers—form the foundation.147  In the great 
bulk of lawmaking in America, “private decisionmakers are in the saddle 
and the courts play a supplementing, facilitating role.  The legislature 
and executive and administration officials are in the far background.”148  
Yet, as Hart and Sacks warn, private decisionmakers, crafting laws that 
will govern their business affairs, must constantly “worry lest [they] 
precipitate a decision by the courts or by the legislature which will take 
away [their] present freedom of choice and establish for the future less 
favorable terms for such arrangements which are mandatory and 
inflexible.”149  From the standpoint of a legislator, however, what is past 
 
 144. Id. (“Examples of donations are disaster relief, poor relief, the soldier’s bonus, and 
pensions and veteran’s benefits whenever these are made available after the private performance 
being recognized was rendered.”). 
 145. Id. at 860-61.  Examples of governmental assurance provided by Hart and Sacks include 
money and currency, government bonds, social security laws, governmental guarantees of loans, 
and governmental certifications of various kinds (such as commodity grades of grain and meat).  Id. 
at 861. 
 146. Id. at 862-63.  A prominent example of a government enterprise is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA).  Id. at 862. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 183.  Cf. id. at 286-87 (discusing “The Great Pyramid of Legal Order”). 
 149. Id. at 184.  Hart and Sacks reproduce, in part, David F. Cavers, Legal Education and 
Lawyer-Made Law, 54 W. VA. L. REV. 177 (1952).  Id. at 186-88.  Cavers notes: “It is a fact that a 
great deal of the law under which all of us live and work in these United States is written, not by 
Congress and the state legislatures or by the courts and the administrative agencies, but by 
American lawyers, sitting in their offices . . . .”  Cavers, supra at 178-79.  Moreover, Cavers 
observes that “the laws that the lawyers write are not called statutes, regulations, and ordinances, or 
judgments, decrees and orders.  We have labels for them such as contracts, deeds, mortgages, 
indentures, leases, wills, trusts, settlements, charters, by-laws, and scores of other terms . . . .”  Id. at 
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is prologue; past private arrangements and experiences coupled with 
judicial review of these matters provide working hypotheses, subject to 
alteration by the legislature, of how “the power of decision ought to be 
allocated among the various agencies, both private and official, who 
might be given a share of it.”150  But the good legislator should try to 
distinguish those cases where legal arrangements should “be left 
primarily to private decision rather than being taken over by some 
officially manned procedure of decision”—such as the terms of 
commercial leases151—from those cases which require some legislative 
intervention—such as the terms of a residential lease.  Hart and Sacks 
provide a worthy set of considerations for the conscientious legislator in 
performing these social judgments: 
Consider the following needs which every lawmaker has: 
Ability to get information about the relevant social and economic and 
economic facts. 
Ability to get information about the relevant attitudes of people 
affected by the arrangement. 
Ability to tailor the substance of the arrangement to the needs of 
special situations, when they are presently known to exist, and to the 
needs of unforeseen future situations, as they arise; or, in the 
alternative, the ability to arrange for such tailoring. 
Ability to get the arrangement accepted by those who will be subject to 
it, either by inducing in them a sense of participation and resulting 
willingness to abide by it, or otherwise. 
A procedure adequate to accomplish these things. 
In what kinds of situations are private lawmakers likely to be in a 
better situation in these respects than any of the various kinds of 
official lawmakers?152 
When a legislator arrives at the conclusion that some type of 
 
179. 
 150. HART & SACKS, supra note 3.  Hart and Sacks illustrate this point in Problem No. 5, 
“Airline Liability for Lost or Damaged Baggage,” drawing upon the experience of “Railroad 
Liability for Lost or Damaged Freight” in Problem No. 4.  See id. at 209-40 (railroad liability), 240-
65 (airline liability). 
 151. Id. at 189. 
 152. Id. at 208-09. 
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statutory prescription of private lawmaking is socially advisable, she 
should be aware that “the legislature may address itself not merely to the 
terms of the arrangement but to the manner in which such terms”153 are 
communicated by one party to another—as exemplified by the late 
nineteenth century state legislation governing contracts between shippers 
and railroads.154  Furthermore, statutory prescriptions of private ordering 
arrangements can focus on merely “foster[ing] and in some degree 
attempt[ing] to coerce the establishment of hosts of private 
governments,”155 as in the case of statutes that mandate good faith 
collective bargaining between management and labor, in private 
industry, to arrive at terms and conditions of employment for workers.156  
In addition, a vigilant legislator will be mindful of the separate legal 
issue of settling disputes between private parties and whether or not any 
official review of the terms of the settlement should be legislatively 
required to be approved by a government official.157  Closely related to 
this issue are two further considerations: (a) whether or not a private 
official, like an arbitrator, should be legislatively allowed to impose a 
non-judicial resolution of a dispute on the parties;158 and (b) whether or 
not a private organization should be legislatively permitted to impose a 
non-judicial resolution of an organizational dispute affecting members 
according to the organization’s idiosyncratic internal rules and 
procedures.159 
2.  Legislative Interaction With Courts 
For Hart and Sacks, a central concern of a good legislator should be 
one of institutional competence in the making of law.160  With this 
concern in mind, a legislator should constantly ask himself two 
overriding questions: (a) “[w]ith respect to this particular matter, is the 
legislature as an institution a more appropriate agency of settlement than 
 
 153. Id.. at 234 (emphasis added). 
 154. See id. at 233-35 (collecting some examples of state statutes). 
 155. Id. at 275. 
 156. See id. at 273-75. 
 157. See id. at 287-304 (discussing Problem No. 7, “Private Release: The Case of the Non-
Litigious Employees” and the issue of whether a federal minimum wage and overtime statute 
allowed private compromise, by way of settlement, of employee wage claims against their 
employer). 
 158. See id. at 305-30 (discussing Problem No. 8, “Private Arbitration: The Case of the 
Litigious Investor”). 
 159. See id. at 331-39 (discussing Problem No. 9, “Settlement of Internal Disputes by Private 
Groups: The Case of the Cantankerous Colonel”). 
 160. Id. at 341. 
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a court?”161; and (b) “[i]s it desirable that the law in this area should take 
the form of an enactment [by way of statute] than of unwritten [judicial] 
grounds of decision?”162  To help answer these questions, the authors 
suggest that a conscientious legislator be aware that a legislature, in 
molding statutes, “may introduce new techniques of control which are 
beyond the reach of innovation by the decisional process,” and that the 
decisional process of common law adjudication has shortcomings as 
well as merits.163  Chief among the attributes of the judicial process of 
lawmaking is the authority of courts, as government organs of “a last-
ditch place or resort [to contribute] to the good ordering of society by 
holding themselves out as agencies of correction of law which is unclear 
or unjust.”164  Prominent among the weaknesses of deploying courts as 
lawmakers is that “[t]he basic function of courts is . . . the function of 
settling disputes.”165  A court’s primary function is not “the development 
of a body of decisional law.”166  The good legislator knows, therefore, 
that judicial decisions that make new law or modify existing law often 
provide a stimulus to more elaborate legislative or private 
arrangements.167  In a related, but reciprocal way, he is also aware that a 
good judge, in searching for relevant public policy in a difficult case, 
might canvass existing statutory enactments touching on the relevant 
issues in the dispute as “premises of reasoning” even though the statutes 
are not directly on point.168 
The able legislator, however, realizes that it is a “[m]yth” that the 
legislature is “[a]ll-[c]ompetent” and [i]ndefatigable.”169  Indeed, due to 
idiosyncratic historical processes, a legislature may choose not to enact 
statutory law in particular substantive areas like Congress’ deference to 
the federal courts in causes of action by the United States in its 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  Moreover, the thorough legislator should be aware that a serious judge will constantly 
be asking herself a series of related questions of institutional competence: 
How should [I as a member of the judiciary] conceive of [my] responsibility to keep this 
[particular] body of law alive and growing?  When can [I] properly say, “the decisional 
law is settled, and any new development or change must come from the legislature?”  
When [am I] obliged to say this?  When, on the other hand, do [I] abdicate responsibility 
if [I] do so? 
Id. 
 163. Id. at 342. 
 164. Id. at 343. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 362-82 (discussing the decision in Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 
67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263 (1854) and the legislative and private response to that decision). 
 168. Id. at 467. 
 169. Id. at 522. 
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proprietary capacity against private persons.170  Moreover, a legislature 
may be overwhelmed with pressing problems of an emergent nature; the 
insightful legislator, then, would encourage courts to deal with novel 
legal issues through deciding the cases on the merits as determined by 
the judiciary through reasoned elaboration of common law principles 
and, if available, general legislative policies.171  The properly humble 
legislator does not buy into the fantasy of legislative omnipotence, but 
embraces judges as sagacious partners in wise social ordering.172 This 
should be the case at least in situations appropriate for adjudication and 
subject to reasoned decision so that judicial discretion does not roam too 
far.173 
3.  Legislative Interplay with Administrative Agencies 
Hart and Sacks suggest that the good legislator, in considering 
whether or not to vote for a particular measure, should carefully weigh 
the merits of the proposal in her own mind and try to fathom how the 
executive branch of government may respond to a statutory scheme.174  
The authors, by implication, acknowledge that even a good legislator, 
however, lacks knowledge and expertise on a variety of legal and 
administrative particulars, and yet must try to make the best possible 
judgment she can about how a proposed statute will be implemented by 
the executive branch.175 
Hart and Sacks, however, hint that a worthy legislator needs to 
realize that a legislature—unlike an administrative agency or a court—is 
not “well equipped to function as an agency of front-line adjustment of 
private relationships” in a society.176  Realizing this inherent institutional 
limitation, therefore, should spur a wise legislator to entrust 
administrative agencies with reasonable discretionary authority to 
creatively implement many statutory schemes. 
 
 170. Id. at 522-24 (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s abdication of lawmaking responsibility 
in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)). 
 171. Id. at 525. 
 172. See id. at 525-26. 
 173. See id. at 640-47 (discussing problems appropriate for adjudication). 
 174. See id. at 1040-41 (discussing hypothetical members of Congress considering the Taft-
Hartley bill in 1947, and their interpretation of the President’s authority to resolve labor strikes 
involving the national interest). 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 1042. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/11
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
2005] THE GOOD AMERICAN LEGISLATOR 923 
4.  Legislative Responsibility For the Interpretation of Statutes 
While chapter seven of The Legal Process is entitled “The Role of 
the Courts in the Interpretation of Statutes,”177 numerous nuggets of 
wisdom exist in this material for informing the role of the conscientious 
legislator in the interpretation of statutes.  Seven points in particular 
deserve some elaboration. 
First, and foremost, in excerpting a nineteenth-century book on 
hermeneutics (exploring the fascinating case of a housekeeper saying to 
a domestic, “fetch some soupmeat”)178 the authors drive home the point 
that “little or nothing is gained by attempting to speak with absolute 
clearness and endless specifications, but that human speech is the 
clearer, the less we endeavor to supply by words and specifications that 
interpretation which common sense must give to human words.”179  
Thus, the good legislator (in crafting the language of a bill in a 
committee mark-up proceeding, in offering amendments to a bill on the 
floor of a legislative body, in considering—in short—the clarity of the 
language being voted on) should think of the wise housekeeper’s 
fundamental simplicity in the use of words. 
Second, continuing their themes of common sense and trust,180 Hart 
 
 177. See id. at 1111-1380. 
 178. Id. at 1114 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 17-20 (2d 
ed. 1880)).  According to the Victorian-era hermeneutics text, relied upon by Hart and Sacks, with 
enduring application to human affairs: 
Common sense and good faith tell the domestic, that the housekeeper’s meaning was 
this: 1. He should go immediately, or as soon as his other occupations are finished; or if 
he be directed to do so in the evening, that he should go next day at the usual hour; 2. 
that the money handed him by the housekeeper is intended to pay for the meat thus 
ordered, and not as a present to him; 3. that he should buy such meat and of such part of 
the animal, as, to his knowledge, has commonly been used in the house he stays at, for 
making soups; 4. that he buy the best meat he can obtain, for a fair price; 5. that he go to 
that butcher who usually provides the family with whom the domestic resides, with meat, 
or to some convenient stall, and not to any unnecessarily distant place; 6. that he return 
the rest of the money; 7. that he bring home the meat in good faith, neither adding 
anything disagreeable nor injurious; 8. that he fetch the meat for the use of the family 
and not for himself.  Suppose, on the other hand, the housekeeper, afraid of being 
misunderstood, had mentioned these eight specifications, she would not have obtained 
her object, if it were to exclude all possibility of misunderstanding.  For, the various 
specifications would have required new ones.  Where would be the end?  We are 
constrained then, always, to leave a considerable part of our meaning to be found out by 
interpretation, which, in many cases must necessarily cause greater or less obscurity with 
regard to the exact meaning, which our words were intended to convey. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 179. Id. at 1115. 
 180. See id. (“However minutely we may define, somewhere we . . . must trust at last to 
common sense and good faith.”) (citation omitted). 
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and Sacks discredit the notion of a literal approach to statutory 
interpretation, while they urge the value of a half dozen pithy guidelines 
for interpreting linguistic commands found in the statutes.  These 
guidelines are as follows: 
Avoid linguistic naiveté.181 
Meaning depends upon context.182 
An essential part of the context of every statute is its purpose.183 
The meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some 
intelligible purpose.184 
The first task in the interpretation of any statute (or of any provision of 
a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it.185 
Deciding what purpose ought to be attributed to a statute is often 
difficult.  But at least three things about it are always easy.186 
Third, the sagacious legislator needs to be aware that, despite his 
own enlightened theory of statutory interpretation and reasonable hopes 
that members of the judiciary will follow it, “[t]he hard truth of the 
matter,” in Hart and Sacks’ inimitable words, “is that American courts 
have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory 
 
 181. Id. at 1124 (“Avoid, in particular, the one-word, one-meaning fallacy.  Words may have 
many different meanings.  There are more ideas in the world to be expressed than there are words in 
any language in which to express them.”). 
 182. Id. (“The way in which you tell which of various possible meanings of a word is the right 
one is by reference to the context.  [To verify this, look at the way any unabridged dictionary is 
made up.]”). 
 183. Id. (“Every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act.  The idea of a 
statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible.”). 
 184. Id. (“Any judicial opinion . . . which finds a plain meaning in a statute without 
consideration of its purpose, condemns itself on its face.  [Such] opinion[s] [are] linguistically, 
philosophically, legally and generally ignorant.”). 
 185. Id. at 1125 (“The principal problem in the development of a workable technique of 
interpretation is the formulation of accepted and acceptable criteria for the attribution of purpose.”). 
 186. Id.  The three easy things, according to the authors, are: 
(a) The statute ought always to be presumed to be the work of reasonable men pursuing 
reasonable purposes reasonably, unless the contrary is made unmistakably to appear.  (b) 
The general words of a statute ought never to be read as directing an irrational pattern of 
particular applications.  (c) What constitutes an irrational pattern of particular 
applications ought always to be judged in the light of the overriding and organizing 
purpose. 
Id. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/11
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
2005] THE GOOD AMERICAN LEGISLATOR 925 
of statutory interpretation.”187  The most that the good legislator can 
assume is that his theory of statutory interpretation “will have some 
foundation in experience and in the best practice of the wisest judges 
[and legislators], and that it will be well calculated to serve the ultimate 
purposes of law.”188 
Fourth, Hart and Sacks demonstrate that the wise legislator—who 
strives to extract insights from every quarter, from the past as well as the 
present—should be aware that musings about statutes, and how they 
should be construed, go back in time many centuries.189  The authors 
incorporate a fascinating excerpt from William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries that counsels, “[t]he fairest and most rational method to 
interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the 
time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”190  
These Blackstonian “signs” are comprised of “the words, the context, the 
subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of 
the law.”191  And, by perusing Blackstone, the good legislator 
understands that many of these insights about the legislative process and 
statutory construction are of an ancient vintage—harking back to the 
thoughts of the Roman lawyer Cicero, the interpretation of medieval 
Bolognian law, and the views of venerable commentators like Grotius.192  
Blackstonian wisdom, moreover, suggests that a sober-minded legislator 
should hope for restrained judicial interpretation of the legislator’s 
handiwork because “law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, 
is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law; 
which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite 
confusion” because in the words of Professor Blackstone, “there would 
then be almost as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, 
as there are differences of capacity and sentiment in the human mind.”193 
Fifth, Hart and Sacks craft a mood of admiration for separation of 
powers values inherent in the American legal process by offering a 
proposed “[m]ood” for a court to “discharge [t]he function” of 
interpreting the respectful legislator’s work product.194  The following 
aphorisms are offered by the authors: 
 
 187. Id. at 1169. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1170. 
 190. Id. (quoting  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-62). 
 191. Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). 
 192. See id. at 1170-71. 
 193. Id. at 1171 (citation omitted). 
 194. Id. at 1374. 
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[Courts should] [r]espect the position of the legislature as the chief 
policy-determining agency of the society, subject only to the 
limitations of the constitution under which it exercises its powers; 
[Courts should] [r]espect the constitutional procedures for the 
enactment of bills; 
[Courts should] [b]e mindful of the dependence of the legislature upon 
the good faith and good sense of the agencies of authoritative 
interpretation; 
[Courts should] [b]e mindful of the nature of language and, in 
particular, of its special nature when used as a medium of giving 
authoritative general directions; and 
[Courts should] [b]e mindful of the nature of law and of the fact that 
every statute is a part of the law and partakes of the qualities of law, 
particularly of the quality of striving for even-handed justice.195 
Sixth, Hart and Sacks remind the upstanding legislator that a 
critical feature of the legislative process, the judicial process—indeed, 
the entire legal process—is that there are limits on “[t]he [m]eaning 
[that] [w]ords [w]ill [b]ear.”196  Thus, the good legislator in fashioning 
the words of a measure, in voting on words in a bill, in considering the 
words of a statute enacted into law should be mindful that “[t]he 
language belongs to the whole society and not to the legislature in office 
for the time being.”197  Accordingly, a mature legislator needs to realize 
that while “[c]ourts on occasion can correct mistakes [in the words of a 
statute], by inserting or striking out a negative when it is completely 
clear from the context that a mistake has been made,” the judiciary 
“cannot permit the legislative process, and all the other processes which 
depend upon the integrity of language, to be subverted by the misuse of 
words.”198  Therefore, the insightful legislator knows that a reviewing 
court examining the words of her statute at some time in the future will 
likely make judicious use of unabridged dictionaries to fathom 
permissible—not definite—linguistic meanings.199  Judges will further 
study her statute with the help of textual maxims or canons “such as 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1375. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1375-76. 
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ejusdem generis, expressio unius est esclusio alterius [and the like] as 
reassurances about the meaning which particular configurations of words 
may have in an appropriate context.”200  Maxims or canons “of [c]lear 
[s]tatement”201 should also be a tool a legislator expects judges to 
employ in the task of reading a statute because these clear statement 
policies “have been judicially developed to promote objectives of the 
legal system which transcend the wishes of any particular session of the 
legislature,” often based on constitutional norms.202 
Finally, chapter seven of The Legal Process reiterates for the good 
legislator the paramount importance of articulating social purposes in a 
statute and the concomitant reality that good judges will, likewise, 
emphasize finding social purposes in a statutory enactment.  In 
“[i]nterpreting the [w]ords [of a statute] [t]o [c]arry [o]ut the [legislative] 
[p]urpose,”203 the complete legislator should be aware that conscientious 
judges will seek to give due regard: to the language of purpose in the 
statute, itself;204 to the “whole context of a statute” including internal 
legislative history;205 to appropriate post-enactment aids such as 
“judicial, administrative and popular construction of a statute”;206 and to 
various “presumption[s] drawn from some general policy of the law.”207 
II.  NEW LEGAL PROCESS PERSPECTIVES 
“Legal process theory remains important in American law, but for 
recent generations of lawyers process theory has taken on new meanings 
and nuances.”208  These new legal process theorists can be usefully 
 
 200. Id. at 1376 (“They should not be treated as rules about the meaning which these 
configurations invariably must have.”).  Hart and Sacks delve into this further: 
As these maxims suggest, the proposition that words must not be given a meaning they 
will not bear operates almost wholly to prevent rather than to compel expansion of the 
scope of statutes.  The meaning of words can almost always be narrowed if the context 
seems to call for narrowing. 
Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  Thus, clear statement rules are particularly important in the case of criminal statutes, 
where the “words which mark the boundary between criminal and non-criminal conduct should 
speak with more than ordinary clearness,” id. at 1376-77, and when a court is faced with statutory 
language of such an expansive and provocative scope that “a court [decides not] to understand a 
legislature as directing a departure from a generally prevailing principle or policy of the law unless 
it does so clearly.”  Id. at 1377. 
 203. Id. at 1380. 
 204. Id. at 1377. 
 205. Id. at 1379. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1380. 
 208. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 206. 
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subdivided into three categories: (1) process formalists, (2) process 
progressives, and (3) process pragmatists.  The discussion that follows 
focuses on what these three groups of theorists say, explicitly or by 
implication, about the institutional role and attributes of the good 
legislator. 
A.  Process Formalists 
“The relatively traditional process thinkers emphasize the positivist 
features of that philosophy: its commitment to neutrality and neutral 
principles, the principle of institutional settlement, and the importance of 
continuity, precedent, and tradition in law,”209 among other 
characteristics. 
Professor Dan Farber, in a 1989 article entitled Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy210 offers a detailed model of 
process formalism.  Farber makes several points relevant to a potential 
theory of the good legislator.  First, from his discussion of “legislative 
supremacy” in policymaking vis-à-vis courts, one could infer that, in 
Farber’s view, a worthy legislator should be concerned about clearly 
articulating collective legislative intent in the words of a statute and in 
any accompanying documents of legislative history.211  To the extent 
intent is not clearly articulated, we would expect a Farberian legislator to 
try to change the language of a statute by appropriate amendment or, at 
the very least, to try to make a record of presumed legislative intent 
through floor statements or committee hearings. 
Second, from Farber’s mention of a legislature’s “meta-intent”212—
a generalized collective process intent that goes beyond the specific 
substantive intent of the statute at bar, to contemplate, for example, that 
judges should not engage in “blind adherence to a statute” in the event of 
“an unforeseen development”213 or that judges should not consider a 
future state of public opinion in interpreting a statute214—one could infer 
that Farber would expect a conscientious legislator to see to it that the 
legislature has expressed this seeming contrarian intent somewhere in 
 
 209. Id. (“This group of thinkers is on the whole eclectic but formalist in its approach to law, 
emphasizing legislative supremacy and, with it, the importance of both textual plain meaning and 
legislative intent.”). 
 210. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 
(1989). 
 211. Id. at 283. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 282. 
 214. Id. at 283. 
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the legislative record. 
Third, Farber provokes thought on the meaning of a good legislator 
by the following observation: 
The idea of legislative intent . . . is notoriously slippery.  If it is taken 
to require that a majority of the legislators share the same subjective 
view of the statute, the condition will rarely be met.  Most legislators 
do not have time actually to read and come to an independent 
understanding of the statutes on which they vote.  Rather, legislators 
depend on institutional actors (sponsors, committees, floor leaders and 
staffers), who are charged with drafting statutes and moving them to 
enactment, to explain the meaning and import of the statutes under 
consideration.  Legislators normally — quite legitimately — accept the 
statements of these actors as commitments about the meaning of the 
enactments.215 
This assertion suggests that as long as these primary institutional 
actors provide accurate and trustworthy accounts of the meaning of 
pertinent legislation, a conscientious legislator is justified in relying on 
short-cuts to ascertaining knowledge of the contents of proposed 
enactments.  However, once this trust is breached, the implication of 
Farber’s analysis is that the good legislator must do extra work in 
searching for replacement primary institutional actors to rely upon and, 
perhaps, rely only on his own close and complete readings of proposed 
statutory texts before casting a vote. 
Fourth, Farber praises Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Tenn. 
Valley Auth. v. Hill216 as “perhaps the most notable modern example of 
conscious judicial adherence to the supremacy principle.”217  Farber 
examines why it was appropriate for the Court to take Congress at its 
word in expressing the unqualified intent of Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act that “commanded all federal agencies ‘to insure that actions 
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the 
continued existence’ of an endangered species, or ‘result in the 
destruction or modification of habitat of such species . . . .’”218  
According to Farber, “As Chief Justice Burger’s opinion made clear, 
Congress had repeatedly rejected efforts to qualify this language with 
references to the impairment of an agency’s primary mission or to 
practicality.  Moreover, the legislative history contains repeated 
references to the mandatory nature . . . of an agency’s duty to protect 
 
 215. Id. at 290 (footnotes omitted). 
 216. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 217. Farber, supra note 210, at 294. 
 218. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended 1979)). 
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endangered species.”219  A judicial interpretation that would discount 
such outward manifestation of intent by Congress while favoring what 
individual members of Congress might have privately felt about the 
policies set forth in the Endangered Species Act “would legitimate . . . 
legislative hypocrisy.”220  In Farber’s view, a good legislator should be 
sincere in voting on a measure and, also, expect his colleagues in the 
legislature to be similarly sincere in their votes.  A good legislator, then, 
like a good judge, in Farber’s words, should expect “the legislature to act 
with integrity” and to “hold legislators to their public positions.”221 
B.  Process Progressives 
“At the other side of the spectrum [from process formalists] but still 
within the legal process tradition, are the progressives, who emphasize 
law’s purposivism, the fidelity owed by officials to reason, and the 
central role of public values,”222 among other themes.  Additional 
commonalities of process progressives include (1) an anti-pluralist bias: 
“legislation must be more than the accommodation of exogenously 
defined interests; law-making is a process of value creation that should 
be informed by theories of justice and fairness”223; (2) an aspiration to 
transcend the justice and fairness deficiencies of legislation by “creative 
law-making by courts and agencies . . . to ensure rationality and justice 
in law”224; and (3) a stress on “the importance of dialogue or 
conversation as the means by which innovative lawmaking can be 
validated in a democratic polity and by which the rule of law can best be 
defended against charges of unfairness or illegitimacy.”225 
The two most prominent proponents of process progressivism are 
Professor Ronald Dworkin and Professor William Eskridge, Jr.  
Dworkin, writing in his 1986 book, Law’s Empire,226 makes one over-
 
 219. Farber, supra note 210, at 294 (footnotes omitted). 
 220. Id. at 298. 
 221. Id.  (“Judges must not allow legislators to use statutes to strike poses, knowing that courts 
will bail them out later.  Not only does the supremacy principle act as a constraint on courts, it also, 
indirectly, disciplines the legislature.”) (footnote omitted).  For other process formalist views, see, 
e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY (1991); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative 
Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767 (1991). 
 222. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 206. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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arching argument that relates to the meaning of a good legislator.  
Dworkin asserts that a “community of principle”227 is worthier than a 
mere “rulebook community”228 and that “legislation as well as 
adjudication must be evaluated by its contribution to the principled 
integrity of the community.”229  As such, in Dworkin’s ideal community 
of principle, “‘integrity in legislation’ requires [the good legislator] to 
try to make the total set of laws morally coherent.”230  In his own words, 
“integrity in legislation . . . restricts what our legislators and other 
lawmakers may properly do in expanding or changing our public 
standards.”231  By implication, moreover, Dworkin’s principle of 
“integrity in adjudication” which “requires our judges, so far as this is 
possible, to treat our present system of public standards as expressing 
and respecting a coherent set of principles, and, to that end, to interpret 
these standards to find implicit standards between and beneath the 
explicit ones,”232 requires the good legislator to exercise integrity in 
legislation in trying to anticipate and ameliorate judicial exercise of 
integrity of adjudication.  Presumably, the worthy legislator could meet 
the principle of legislation by insisting that statutory language grants 
broad powers of judicial review and judicial supplementation of core 
legislative standards. 
Professor William Eskridge, in his 1994 book Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation,233 advances a number of points relevant to a potential 
theory of a good legislator.  I shall focus on five salient observations that 
Eskridge made.  First, his description of statute-making “in the modern 
regulatory state”234 suggests that the proficient legislator in today’s 
 
 227. Id. at 216.  Dworkin notes: 
A community of principle accepts integrity.  It condemns checkerboard statutes and less 
dramatic violations of that ideal as violating the associative character of its deep 
organization.  Internally compromised statutes cannot be seen as flowing from any single 
coherent scheme of principle; on the contrary, they serve the incompatible aim of a 
rulebook community, which is to compromise convictions along lines of power.  They 
contradict rather than confirm the commitment necessary to make a large and diverse 
political society a genuine rather than a bare community: the promise that law will be 
chosen, changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way. 
Id. at 214. 
 228. Id. at 212 (“People in a rulebook community are free to act in politics almost as selfishly 
as people in a community of circumstances can.  Each one can use the standing political machinery 
to advance his own interests or ideals.”). 
 229. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 206. 
 230. Id. at 206-07. 
 231. DWORKIN, supra note 226, at 217. 
 232. Id. 
 233. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
 234. Id. at 2. 
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context of complexity must be adept at understanding sometimes arcane 
policy ends and means in an elaborate mosaic of overlapping regulatory 
statutes.  Eskridge contends that modern statutes crafted by legislators: 
are greater [in number]; more of them are detailed in their 
prescriptions; statutes are frequently written as directives not to the 
citizenry but to the bureaucracy.  Statutes today often delegate to 
agencies the authority to make specific rules.  The content of the 
statute then consists of creating or identifying the agency, structuring 
its decision making, and suggesting the overall goals or guidelines for 
the agency’s ongoing implementation of the statutory scheme.  The 
legitimacy and operation of the modern state begins, and sometimes 
ends, with the official whose job it is to apply and interpret the 
statute.235 
Second, Eskridge updates and modifies the Hart and Sacks 
assumption that legislators are “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable 
purposes reasonably.”236  According to Eskridge, this “assumption is 
either trivial or false under modern thinking about the legislative 
process,”237 because of the current realization that legislators, in their 
preoccupation to get re-elected, tend to avoid the hard and risky work of 
statutory policymaking in favor of other activities.  As Eskridge 
explains: 
[L]egislators have a complex bundle of goals, most notably achieving 
re-election and prestige inside the beltway, as well as contributing to 
good public policy.  To the extent that reelection is an important goal 
of legislators, they tend to deemphasize bold policy entrepreneurship 
and, instead, seek out popular activities such as pork barrel projects 
and constituent service to please important interest groups while 
avoiding positions that antagonize constituents or groups, and work out 
compromises on big issues that cannot be avoided.  Given these 
political realities, reasonable legislators do not always produce 
reasonable policies.  Some statutes are little else but back-room deals 
which distribute public benefits to groups that legislators want to help.  
This suggests that identifying the actual or even conventional purpose 
of a statute is just as difficult as identifying the actual or conventional 
intent of the legislature, or perhaps even more so, since legislators may 
have incentives to obscure the real purposes of the statute.  Legislators 
do not say, “This is a back-room deal, distributing rents to a group.”  
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 26 (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378).  See also supra note 186 and 
accompanying text. 
 237. ESKRIDGE, supra note 233, at 26. 
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Instead they say, “This statute helps America!”238 
Eskridge’s insight about modern legislator behavior, while more 
skeptical than the Hart and Sacks view of the legislative process, does 
not obviate the conception of a good legislator.  An Eskridgean good 
legislator simply needs to be more strategic: she needs to balance pursuit 
of pork, interaction with constituents and re-election activities with the 
pursuit of a few key legislative initiatives (e.g., authoring bills, co-
sponsoring bills, committee or subcommittee oversight investigations, 
pursuit of legislative leadership posts, independent research) which she 
thinks are important for her district and for the larger polity (i.e. nation 
or state).239 
Third, Eskridge adds nuance and sophistication to a description of 
modern legislative process in his explanation of legislative drafting of 
bills.  He observes, in this regard: 
[F]or any statute of consequence, the legislative drafting process 
ensures textual ambiguities, which only multiply over time.  
Ambiguities arise because there is no single author, because different 
authors write and rewrite provisions at different times and with 
different goals or strategies in mind, and because the goals of at least 
some of the authors are to create rather than avoid ambiguity.240 
From the perspective of the good legislator, this insight suggests 
that the power and influence of an individual legislator can be magnified 
by having his staff keep track of bills that he cares about (for political, 
policy or ideological reasons) and offering proposed amendatory 
language (directly through his own suggestions or indirectly through 
another legislator, lobbyist or staff person). 
Fourth, Eskridge expounds on the nature of personal perspective in 
the interpretation of statutory texts that has relevance for a robust theory 
of the good legislator.  In rejecting what he labels “naive textualism” 
Eskridge contends that “the interpreter’s own context, including her 
situatedness in a certain generation and a certain status in our society, 
influences the way she reads simple texts.”241  An astute legislator, like a 
crafty judge interpreting a statute in an adjudicatory setting, would be 
able to enhance her persuasive impact on other legislators in voting for 
or against particular language in a legislative document (e.g. bill, report, 
 
 238. Id. at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). 
 239. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text. 
 240. ESKRIDGE, supra note 233, at 38. 
 241. Id. at 41.  Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 
1081-92 (2002) (discussing perspectivism as an aesthetic of law). 
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amendment, resolution) by fully appreciating the situatedness of other 
legislators and pitching reasons according to different perspectives. 
Fifth, Eskridge helps a conscientious legislator to appreciate that 
“[b]ecause statutes have an indefinite life, they apply to fact situations 
well into the future,” and that “[w]hen successive applications of the 
statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors, the statute’s 
meaning evolves beyond original expectations.”242  Moreover, as 
Eskridge explains, “sometimes subsequent applications reveal that 
factual or legal assumptions of the original statute have become (or were 
originally) erroneous; then the statute’s meaning often evolves against 
its original expectations.”243  Such deep knowledge about the legal 
process—amalgamating legislation, private ordering, adjudication and 
executive implementation—counsels for a legislator to cultivate 
epistemic humility in realizing that all things, including statutory 
enactments, evolve over time.  Eskridge likens a statutory act to a 
[V]essel launched on some one-way voyage from the old world to the 
new.  The vessel is not going to return; nor are its passengers.  Having 
only what they set out with, they cope as best they can.  On arrival in 
the present, they deploy their native endowments under conditions 
originally unguessed at.”244 
All in all, Eskridge points out that statutory interpretation is 
hierarchical and ever-changing—something the wise legislator should 
never forget: 
Statutory interpretation is hierarchical and sequential.  Interpretations 
by private parties can be corrected by administrators, who can be 
reversed by judges, who can be overridden by the legislature.  Even if 
agencies and courts seriously sought to enforce original intent, text, or 
purpose, they would not do so because of a hydraulic process of 
feedback and anticipation which occurs as the system works out 
statutory meaning for issues that arise.  Thus it is that agencies and 
courts are constantly pressed from below—by private communities of 
interpretation, by interest groups, by ground-level implementations of 
the statute—to interpret the statute in ways that are responsive to new 
facts, new needs, new ideas.  They are also pressed from above—by 
congressional committees, by threat of legislative override, by the 
president—to interpret the statute in ways that are responsive to 
 
 242. ESKRIDGE, supra note 233, at 49. 
 243. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 244. Id. (quoting FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 356 (1984)). 
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current rather than historical political preferences.245 
C.   Process Pragmatists 
“In between process formalists and progressives lie a centrist group, 
which travels under the banner of ‘pragmatism.’”246 The overarching 
theme of this group of thinkers is “the eclectic and instrumental features 
of the process tradition: legal reasoning is a grab bag of different 
techniques, including not just textual analysis, but also sophisticated 
appreciation of the goals underlying the legal text and the consequences 
of adopting different interpretations.”247 
While several commentators have struck process pragmatist 
notes,248 I will focus on the most prominent voice of this process-based 
legal philosophy: Judge Richard A. Posner.249  Two recent publications, 
one a book and one a law review article, provide his most recent 
thinking on the subject.250 
In his 2003 book, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy,251 Judge 
Posner makes numerous comments about law and pragmatism in a 
democratic context that helps us flesh out a good legislator theory.  First, 
Posner contrasts the “pragmatic mood” with the speculative mood by 
contrasting the actions of Odysseus in Homer’s Odyssey with those of 
Achilles in the Iliad.  As Posner explains: 
The pragmatic mood is already visible in the Odyssey.  The poem 
opens with Odysseus living on a remote island ruled by a nymph who 
offers him immortality if he will remain as her consort.  A bit 
surprisingly to anyone steeped in the orthodox Western religio-
philosophical-scientific tradition, he refuses, preferring mortality and a 
 
 245. ESKRIDGE, supra note 233, at 49. 
 246. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 207 (footnotes omitted). 
 247. Id. (“Law involves a balance between form and substance, tradition and innovation, text 
and context.”). 
 248. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Margaret 
J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989). 
 249. For a discussion of Posner’s judicial opinion style — which incorporates his pragmatic 
legal philosophy, see Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First 
Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991 — Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 
MO. L. REV. 73 (2004); Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s 
Appellate Opinions, 1981-82 — Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style during an 
Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2000). 
 250. See infra notes 251-67 and accompanying text.  Posner’s early thinking on pragmatism is 
articulated in two books: RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) 
and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). 
 251. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
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dangerous struggle to regain his position as the king of a small, rocky 
island and be revisited with his son, aging wife, and old father.  He 
turns down what the orthodox tradition says he should desire above all 
else, the peace that comes from overcoming the transience and 
vicissitudes of mortality, whether that peace takes the form of personal 
immortality or of communing with eternal verities, moral or scientific 
— in either case ushering us to the still point of the turning world.  
Odysseus prefers going to arriving, struggle to rest, exploring to 
achieving — curiosity is one of his most marked traits — and risk to 
certainty. . . . 
Another thing that is odd about the protagonist, and the implicit values 
of the Odyssey from the orthodox standpoint is that Odysseus is not a 
conventional hero, the kind depicted in the Iliad.  He is strong, brave, 
and skillful in fighting, but he is no Achilles (who had a divine mother) 
or even Ajax; and he relies on guile, trickery, and outright deception to 
a degree inconsistent with what we have come to think of as heroism 
or its depiction in the Iliad.  His dominant trait is skill in coping with 
his environment rather than ability to impose himself upon it by brute 
force.  He is the most intelligent person in the Odyssey but his 
intelligence is thoroughly practical, adaptive.  Unlike Achilles, in the 
Iliad, who is given to reflection, notably about the heroic ethic itself, 
Odysseus is pragmatic.  He is an instrumental reasoner rather than a 
speculative one.252 
The good legislator, then, clutching the shield of Odysseus instead 
of the shield of Achilles, should embrace the hurley-burley of day-to-day 
political struggle; should appreciate the power of the indirect path in 
legislative maneuvering, avoiding, when possible, direct confrontation; 
should be skillful in tactical deception of opponents (and even allies) in 
the pursuit of legislative ends.  Indeed, the Odyssean legislator implied 
by Posner’s description, seems to be embodied in the machinations and 
intrigues of Lyndon Johnson’s years in the United States Senate 
chronicled in Robert Caro’s book, Master of the Senate.253 
Second, Posner’s take on pragmatism teaches the good legislator 
that values of commerce and evolution are important in fashioning 
useful legislative products.  In short, Posner contends that citizens in a 
society, such as the United States, who are focused on trade, are little 
interested in “ultimate truths,” and realize that argument and debate over 
fundamental issues “can be divisive as well as harmonizing.”254  
 
 252. Id. at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). 
 253. ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE (2002). 
 254. POSNER, supra note 251, at 31. 
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Moreover, such citizens value human intelligence as a method to cope 
with their environment, not to arrive at “metaphysical insights that . . . 
have no adaptive value.”255  So the good legislator should go about his 
job looking for practical problems to solve while being mindful of the 
power of markets in allocating scarce resources. 
Third, the wise legislator can learn about the utility of legal 
pragmatism as a strategy for legislating by considering the implications 
of Posner’s account of the pragmatic judge.  Thus, if the pragmatic judge 
should be concerned with “systemic and not just case-specific 
consequences,” framed by the “ultimate criterion of . . . 
reasonableness,”256 and the “critical use of history,”257 this seems to be 
impeccable guidance for the conscientious legislator, as well.  Indeed, 
the greater elasticity of the concept of legislative facts as compared to 
adjudicative facts258 might require the good legislator to engage in more 
sophisticated and broader assessments of consequences in passing or not 
passing a particular piece of legislation than the good judge in reasoning 
about judicial outcomes and doctrinal developments.  Yet, mindful that a 
“pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad grounds of decision 
in the early stages in the development of legal doctrine,”259 the 
pragmatic legislator, by analogy, should tend to favor incremental 
legislation over sweeping and comprehensive legislation when a new 
social problem or technology cries out for a statutory solution. 
In a 2003 article entitled Reply: The Institutional Dimension of 
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation,260 Judge Posner criticizes 
the lead article in the issue co-authored by Professors Cass R. Sunstein 
and Adrian Vermeule entitled Interpretation and Institutions.261  
Posner’s discussion of institutional considerations in interpretation of 
statutes and constitutions by courts highlights important factors to keep 
in mind in comparing the various branches of government: 
These include the structure and personnel of the judiciary and of the 
legal profession more broadly; the structure, personnel, and operating 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 59. 
 257. Id. at 72. 
 258. Adjudicative facts are those “specific to the case [and] provable only by sworn testimony 
or other trial-type methods.”  Id. at 76.  Legislative facts constitute “the background or context of 
the dispute giving rise to the case.”  Id. 
 259. Id. at 80. 
 260. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003). 
 261. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
885 (2003). 
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methods of the legislature; the relative competence of the different 
branches of government with respect to specific classes of issue; the 
power relations among the branches; and the political, economic, and 
social institutions of the society.262 
Posner disagrees with Sunstein and Vermeule’s claim that 
institutional considerations of the legal process have been 
underappreciated by scholars.263  In this regard, Posner notes first—at 
one end of the spectrum—that: 
[S]tudents of public choice theory, and political conservatives 
generally [like Judge Frank Easterbrook]—who are skeptical about the 
good faith of legislators, fear the excesses of democracy, think of 
statutes as unprincipled compromises, and do not want to help 
legislators achieve their ends (these skeptics may doubt that legislation 
has ends worthy of assistance)—tend to favor strict interpretation.  
They doubt that statutes have a “spirit” or coherent purposes that might 
channel loose interpretation.  They may also wish to hamstring 
legislatures, forcing them to make constant amendments to adjust to 
changing conditions; courts committed to strict construction refuse to 
lend legislatures a helping hand.264 
The implications of this observation for a possible theory of the 
good legislator range from a nihilistic interpretation (i.e. the idea of good 
legislators is a sham; there are no such beasts as good legislators, only 
self-maximizing legislators making expedient deals) to a more modest 
skeptical interpretation (i.e. while the idea of good legislators is not 
necessarily a sham, most legislation crafted by legislators is based on 
unprincipled compromises that advance the careers of individual 
legislators in return for rents paid to special interest groups that profit at 
the public’s expense). 
Second, Posner notes the interplay of institutional assumptions of 
an opposite nature from the public choice theorists: 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the skeptics, Hart and Sacks 
[among others] urge loose interpretation . . . and do so on the basis of 
an explicit belief in the essential good faith, care, intelligence, and 
public spiritedness of legislators, who these scholars believe welcome 
a helping hand from judges.  They may be quite wrong about 
legislators, but they can hardly be accused of being blind to 
institutional considerations—those are the very considerations that 
 
 262. Posner, supra note 260, at 954 (footnote omitted). 
 263. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 261, at 886. 
 264. Posner, supra note 260, at 955-56 (footnote omitted). 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/11
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
2005] THE GOOD AMERICAN LEGISLATOR 939 
motivate their theories.265 
For Posner, loose interpretation of statutes versus formalistic 
interpretation “depends precisely on [pragmatic] institutional factors that 
vary across nations, legal cultures, issues, and epochs.”266  As he 
explains in greater detail, his pragmatic process bent can lead to different 
approaches: 
[The German legal theorist] von Savigny[ ] propos[ed] that the 
German states (he was writing long before Germany became a nation 
in 1871) adopt the law of ancient Rome as the law of Germany—a 
highly formalistic version of Roman law, moreover [that deplored 
judicial discretion].  I have argued that Savigny’s formalism was right 
for his time and place, where the urgent need (as in developing 
societies today) was for clear, uniform rules that could be applied 
mechanistically; and that Holmes’ rejection of that formalism was right 
for his time and place, which were very different from Savigny’s.  By 
Holmes’ time, “[t]he American legal system . . . had the suppleness 
and enjoyed the public confidence to be able to adapt legal principles 
to current social needs without undue danger of sacrificing legitimacy 
or creating debilitating uncertainty.”267 
Viewed from the standpoint of the good legislator, Posner’s 
arguments in his Michigan Law Review article imply that the following 
aspects of legislator behavior can and should vary (depending on the 
comparative competencies and ideologies of his fellow legislators, 
members of the judiciary, and executive branch personnel): the 
substance of issues to be investigated and those that should be the 
subject of legislative proposals for change; the use of narrow legal rules 
versus broader standards in legislative enactments; close oversight of 
judicial and agency interpretation of enacted legislation, with 
accompanying frequent statutory corrective amendments versus lax 
oversight with infrequent statutory amendments. 
III.  FUTURE LEGAL PROCESS POSSIBILITIES 
How can the good American legislator project, consistent with the 
 
 265. Id. at 956 (footnote omitted).  Indeed, Posner relates a point made by Neil Duxbury: 
“[According to Hart and Sacks,] [a]djudication . . . is but one form of institutional activity within the 
legal process.  Sometimes, within that process, legislatures, administrative agencies, arbitrators — 
even private parties themselves — may be better suited than the courts to deal with particular 
disputes.”  Posner, supra note 260, at 956 (quoting NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 255 (1995)). 
 266. Posner, supra note 260, at 959. 
 267. Id. at 958-59 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45
Blomquist: The Good American Legislator
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
940 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:895 
Legal Process tradition discussed in Parts I and II, be extended in the 
future?268  For purposes of this preliminary Article, I sketch three 
possible themes: (a) legislative ethics, (b) legislative advocacy, and (c) 
legislative webs. 
A.  Legislative Ethics 
More attention needs to be paid to how ethics interacts with the 
legislative process, in general, and how ethics relates to the conception 
of the good legislator, in particular.  Is the art of being a legislator 
limited to egotistical power plays?  Is there such a concept as moral 
knowledge that can be applied to the enterprise of trying to describe 
what the good legislator does?  The philosopher Simon Blackburn in his 
little book, Being Good,269 discusses some interesting possibilities for 
applying moral knowledge to the legislative process when he writes: 
Is there moral progress?  [This question is] not answered by science, or 
religion, or metaphysics, or logic.  [It has] to be answered from within 
our own moral perspective.  Then, fortunately, there are countless 
small, unpretentious things that we know with perfect certainty.  
Happiness is preferable to misery, and dignity is better than 
humiliation.  It is bad that people suffer, and worse if a culture turns a 
blind eye to their suffering.  Death is worse than life; the attempt to 
find a common point of view is better than manipulative contempt for 
it. 
. . . . 
. . .[I]f we reflect on an increased sensitivity to the environment, to 
sexual difference, to gender, to people different from ourselves in a 
whole variety of ways, we can see small, hard-won, fragile, but 
undeniable causes of pride.  If we are careful and mature, and 
imaginative, and fair, and nice, and lucky, the moral mirror in which 
we gaze at ourselves may not show us saints.  But need it not show us 
monsters either.270 
Lucinda Peach, incorporates religious belief into an analysis of the 
good legislator.  Her book, Legislating Morality,271 provides one of the 
few serious explorations of the role that religion should play in a 
 
 268. See infra notes 9-267 and accompanying text. 
 269. SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (2001). 
 270. Id. at 134-35. 
 271. LUCINDA PEACH, LEGISLATING MORALITY: PLURALISM AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN 
LAWMAKING (2002). 
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legislator’s public decisions.  By way of example, she gives the 
following fascinating hypothetical that raises vital questions about how 
far personal religious conviction should go in framing the ethical 
perspective of a good legislator: 
A state senator in a politically liberal state is contemplating how to 
vote on an upcoming bill regarding the abortion rights of minors.  The 
bill would require the written consent of at least one parent before a 
doctor could legally perform an abortion requested by the minor.  
Many of the senator’s constituents think the parental consent 
requirement is too restrictive, at least in the absence of some 
alternative procedure that would enable the minor to obtain the 
mandated authorization, and that a less burdensome parental 
notification requirement like several surrounding states have passed 
would be preferable.  Despite the views of these constituents, the 
senator is reluctant to vote against the bill.  Abortion is morally wrong 
according to his religious beliefs, and he is thus inclined to restrict the 
right to abortion whenever possible. 
. . . . 
. . .How should the [legislator] in th[is] scenario[ ] make [his] decision[ 
]?  Should [he] rely on [his] personal religious convictions or those of 
interested parties . . .?  Or should [he] view religious considerations as 
inappropriate or even unconstitutional grounds for decision?272 
Peach’s comments raise the larger ethical, legal process issue of 
how diligently a legislator should be in scrutinizing the constitutionality 
of legislation that she votes on.  The good legislator should take 
constitutional questions of legislation seriously and should seek to 
modify proposed unconstitutional legislation to remove unconstitutional 
provisions and—if not successful in modifying the proposal—should 
vote against it. 
Another related ethical inquiry that deserves more theoretical 
attention is what non-religious sources of ethical principles a good 
legislator should seek to draw upon in making public decisions that have 
an impact on religious beliefs of members of the polity. 
 
 272. Id. at 3-4.  It would seem that the good legislator should reject out of hand any legislative 
proposal that, in his honest opinion, is or probably would be declared unconstitutional by the 
appellate judiciary.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Legislative Advocacy 
More thought needs to be given to defining and providing examples 
and explanations of the art of legislative advocacy by good legislators.  
In this regard, Jack Davies, in his book Legislative Law and Practice,273 
synthesized existing scholarship in describing roles and types of 
individual legislators—with certain characteristics being worthy of 
praise and other characteristics worthy of criticism.  The “lawmaker” is a 
“legislative hero.”274  “Each lawmaker comes to the legislature with a 
purpose.  Personal satisfaction comes not from public reputation, or high 
political position, but from results.”275  Indeed, “[t]he formulation and 
production of legislation are foremost, and the lawmaker spends more 
energy and attention on this than any other legislative type.”276  
Moreover, “[t]he lawmaker is often a career legislator, and becomes . . . 
expert at using the structure and processes of the institution as an 
effective means to further public policy goals.”277  My own scholarship 
has discussed the late Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine as a 
legislative hero in his masterful use of the subcommittee process in the 
United States Senate to further environmental policy goals.278 
Davies also discusses the following additional types of 
legislators—some being more praiseworthy than others: “[t]he 
advertiser,”279 “[t]he reluctant,”280 “[t]he spectator,”281 “[t]he tribune,”282 
 
 273. JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed.1986). 
 274. Id. at 36. 
 275. DAVIES, supra note 273, at 36. 
 276. Id . 
 277. Id. 
 278. See Robert F. Blomquist, In Search of Themis: Toward the Meaning of the Ideal 
Legislator — Senator Edmund S. Muskie and the Early Development of Modern American 
Environmental Law, 1965-1968, 28 WM & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV 539 (2004). 
 279. DAVIES, supra note 273, at 37.  According to Davies: 
The advertiser, bursting with ambition, comes to the legislature, not with an agenda for 
lawmaking, but rather with an agenda of personal advancement.  Legislative office was 
sought and won, not because it was dreamed of, but rather because it was there, like 
Mount Everest, and climbing it would bring honor and profit.  Since the advertiser’s 
personal advancement depends so heavily upon reputation, the advertiser selects a few 
high visibility issues and pursues them aggressively.  Legislative service is only a 
temporary interest for the advertiser.  After one or two terms the advertiser is ready to 
use the public recognition earned in the legislature for personal advancement elsewhere. 
Id.  
 280. Id.  In Davies’ words: 
The reluctant does not come to the legislature to pursue a personal agenda of issues, or to 
achieve personal notoriety and success.  She desires merely to be competent in her role 
as a cog in the legislative machine.  Emphasizing rules of legislative process over the 
substance of particular bills, she believes that proper procedures will ensure proper 
legislation.  The reluctant provides the legislative balance wheel, protecting the 
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“[t]he ritualist,”283 “[t]he inventor,”284 “[t]he broker,”285 “[t]he 
opportunist,”286 “[t]he shaman,”287 “[t]he warlord,”288 “[t]he 
godfather,”289 “[t]he dependable friend,”290 and “[t]he idealogue.”291  
 
institution from those who would pursue their lawmaking or advertising at all cost. 
Id.  
 281. Id.  The spectator: 
[is a] born follower . . . lack[ing] the ability or self confidence to promote his own 
legislation.  Having a low standard of success, he is content to bask in the prestige of 
office, and act as a supporter of party leaders.  Since his participation in legislation is 
strictly vicarious [one seeking to lobby] the legislature need not worry about the 
spectator.  If the support of party leaders is gained, the support of the spectator will soon 
follow. 
Id. at 37-38. 
 282. Id. at 38.  As Davies explains: 
Historically, the tribune’s function was to fight the people’s battles against the Crown.  
The tribune in the legislature today is concerned mainly with taking care of problems at 
home; doing case work for constituents that does not necessarily have anything to do 
with legislation.  If the tribune is involved with the formulation of legislation, it is a bill 
to aid the home district. 
Id.  
 283. Id.  The ritualist, having similarities to the reluctant, “is an expert at the intricate 
procedures, rules, etiquettes and formal understandings of the legislative process.  The ritualist 
emphasizes the formal aspects of capitol hill duties and routines; legislative work, overseeing, 
investigation and committee specialization serve as the means to gain influence.”  Id. 
 284. Id.  “An inventor emphasizes problem solving or policy innovation, and takes a broad 
view of the role as a legislator.”  Id.  
 285. Id. at 39.  This legislative type, serves as a “politician in a pluralistic society, balancing 
and blending diverse interests, including home district interests versus [the state or] national 
interests.”  Id.  
 286. Id. at 39.  “This legislator stresses the job of campaigning and re-election.  Although all 
[legislators] have a primary interest in re-election, some have no other interest.”  Id. 
 287. Id.  Interestingly: 
This little known legislator is most visible after a crisis (such as Three Mile Island) 
dispensing shame for greater self glory.  The shaman’s power does not derive from the 
authority of position, or from any practical results produced, but from the confidence 
displayed, and the emotion extracted from followers.  The shaman is an expert at making 
real the threats of unseen demons: world communism, the Mafia, monopoly cabals, the 
moral majority, or the immoral minority. 
Id.  
 288. Id.  According to Davies: 
This legislator carefully chooses one piece of legislative terrain, slowly dominates it, 
strengthens it, and gradually extends it outwards, increasing its scope.  The warlord 
concentrates on intensive, rather than extensive politics.  As a group, warlords hold the 
real power.  Although each controls only a part of the whole organization, they have 
strategically selected every spot to maximize a particular brand of power. 
Id.  
 289. Id. at 40.  A master manipulator who: 
[i]gnor[es] the committee structure, this tactician concentrates on the political party 
structure, seeking elected posts within [the legislature] as party whip and party leader, 
putting together ad-hoc coalitions and deals, and playing a fast game.  Like warlords, the 
godfathers have a career commitment to [the legislature], but unlike them, they are too 
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Davie’s typology is useful in pigeonholing a few legislators like the late 
U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, whose demagogic anti-
communism exhibited the shaman and the ideologue types.292  For more 
complex legislator types, like Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, we 
can chart an evolutionary matrix of types: starting in 1949 with a razor-
thin electoral majority, Johnson acted the roles of the dependable friend 
to conservative southern interests and the advertiser, to gain personal 
financial security.  Later, in 1950 through 1952, he assumed the 
legislative roles of the shaman and the ideologue, ranting at America’s 
so-called lack of military preparation for the Korean War.  Then, from 
the early 1950’s until his election as Vice President in 1960, LBJ 
assumed the role of broker and godfather, as he took on party leadership 
positions within the United States Senate, culminating in his selection as 
the youngest Majority Leader in American history.293 
Another helpful book on the subject of legislative advocacy—from 
the standpoint of Speaker of the Wisconsin House of Representatives—
is Tom Loftus’ book, The Art of Legislative Politics.294  Drawing on 
 
impatient to accrue power slowly in a single area.  Godfathers act as brokers, keeping 
warlords in balance by treating them as any politician treats a constituency.  They are 
backroom negotiators and group facilitators. 
Id. 
 290. Id.  The dependable friend type is not hard to spot: 
Soon after a person is seated as a member of a legislative body, observers spot patterns 
in the votes cast.  The legislator may demonstrate consistent allegiance to party, to [the] 
farm bloc, to management, to labor, to the chief executive, or to the local courthouse 
crowd, editor, or industry. . . . 
  For the legislator, being thought of as a dependable friend creates problems.  When a 
vote is cast against political allies, they feel double-crossed and resentful, or at least let 
down.  A respected political slogan is, “You dance with them what brung you.”  A 
legislator votes against traditional allies with reluctance because the price of doing so is 
high. 
  The problem of being no one’s dependable friend is daunting.  If the performance of 
a legislator is so unpredictable that it earns the loyal support of no constituency, the 
legislator seeks re-election lacking a strong base of support.  It is difficult to be a 
maverick in an institution and in a profession where loyalty is a highly valued quality. 
Id. at 40-41. 
 291. Id. 
The ideological legislator takes a totalitarian stand on the few issues which are near and 
dear to his heart, while all but ignoring the other issues before the legislature.  The 
ideologue will settle only for the perfect solution to pet projects, not for a workable 
solution.  This hard line approach and an interest in only a few issues makes the 
ideologue an ineffective and short lived legislator. 
Id.  
 292. See CARO, supra note 253, at 542-56 (discussing McCarthy’s unscrupulous anti-
communist activities). 
 293. Id. at 109-515 (discussing LBJ’s meteoric rise to power in the U.S. Senate). 
 294. TOM LOFTUS, THE ART OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS (1994). 
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fourteen years in the Wisconsin House, Loftus provides an insider’s 
account of who wins legislative battles and how, what influences a 
legislator’s vote, what leadership strategies are effective in passing or 
blocking bills, and what tactics lobbyists employ.  In the same genre as 
the Loftus book is John E. McDonough’s fascinating book, Experiencing 
Politics: A Legislator’s Stories of Government and Health Care.295  
McDonough, who was a member of the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives for thirteen years, knits together stories of politics, 
policy and lawmaking with interesting theoretical models.  McDonough, 
in the spirit of Hart and Sacks, takes an optimistic view of the potential 
of legislative process and politics to solve social problems, concluding 
his book with the following observation: 
Whatever the prevailing corruption-influence peddling climate, each 
generation spawns leaders who attempt to summon the best in us, who 
seek to use politics for the improvement of society, and who keep their 
gaze firmly fixed on the opportunities to improve social and economic 
justice.  Many times, they fall short and fail.  At other times, they 
create the civil rights and women’s rights revolution, public education, 
Social Security, workers’ compensation, child labor laws, 
unemployment insurance, Medicare and Medicaid, and so much more. 
Politics is by no means the only mechanism at our disposal for the 
improvement of society and individuals.  But it is a mightily important 
one.  We need to pay it more respect.296 
Scholars should follow McDonough’s lead and explore the 
numerous advocacy roles played by the good legislator—in constituent 
casework, in investigatory activities and in ethically advocating 
legislative proposals. 
Finally, good legislative advocacy by the good legislator is 
informed by the tradition of Machiavelli’s classic book, The Prince.297  
This might be viewed as the realm of principled hard-ball politics.  A 
few good books discuss the details of this sport.  Two of the best are 
Chris Matthew’s Hardball298 and Carnes Lord’s The Modern Prince.299 
 
 295. JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, EXPERIENCING POLITICS: A LEGISLATOR’S STORIES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND HEALTH CARE (2000). 
 296. Id. at 322. 
 297. See NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Paul Sonnino trans., Humanities Press 1996) 
(1513). 
 298. See CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS, HARDBALL (1988). 
 299. See CARNES LORD, THE MODERN PRINCE (2003).  In a book review, a critic says the 
following about Lord’s work: 
Borrowing from Plato and Aristotle, Mr. Lord warns that “the people” can be a fickle lot 
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C.   Legislative Webs300 
Renewed effort should be undertaken to understand the ways that 
the good legislator interacts with other people and institutions in the 
process of making laws.  This theme overlaps to a degree with the theme 
of legislative ethics301 (because in any web of interactions the good 
legislator must be mindful of ethical considerations) and with the theme 
of legislative advocacy302 (since one of the main purposes of 
participating in webs with other people will be for the good legislator to 
be an effective advocator of proposed laws).  Yet, the theme of 
legislative webs is distinct for the two reasons: (1) what a good legislator 
hopes to accomplish is derived not only from her past experiences and 
ideology, but also from her connections with a variety of other people 
and institutions while serving as a legislator, and (2) how a good 
legislator goes about pursuing her hopes for a legislative 
accomplishment depends on the information, ideas and examples 
available to her. 
A classic book on the constellation of pressures and personalities 
inherent in the legislative process is Eric Redman’s The Dance of 
 
and that often their will and the rule of law are at odds with each other.  It is precisely to 
temper the passions of the people that we resort to representative rather than direct 
democracy.  Such a form of government, in turn, imposes an obligation on our elected 
leaders not merely to follow public opinion but to shape it. 
Brian M. Carney, What Machiavelli Can Still Teach Us, Even in a Democracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
21, 2003, at D8. 
 300. I draw on the writings of J.R. McNeill and William H. McNeill for inspiration in 
articulating this legal process possibility.  In their book, the McNeills posit a much more expansive 
web of interaction than I envision.  According to the McNeills: 
A web [of interaction in human history] . . . is a set of connections that link people to one 
another.  These connections may take many forms: chance encounters, kinship, 
friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity, economic exchange, ecological exchange, 
political cooperation, even military competition.  In all such relationships, people 
communicate information and use that information to guide their future behavior.  They 
also communicate, or transfer, useful technologies, goods, crops, ideas, and much else.  
Furthermore, they inadvertently exchange diseases and weeds, items they cannot use but 
which affect their lives (and deaths) nonetheless.  The exchange and spread of such 
information, items, and inconveniences, and human responses to them, is what shapes 
history. 
  What drives history is the human ambition to alter one’s condition to match one’s 
hopes.  But just what people hoped for, both in the material and the spiritual realms, and 
how they pursued their hopes, depended on the information, ideas, and examples 
available to them.  Thus, webs channeled and coordinated everyday human ambition and 
action — and still do. 
J.R. MCNEILL & WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE HUMAN WEB: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF WORLD 
HISTORY 3-4 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 301. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 273-99 and accompanying text. 
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Legislation.303  Redman spent two years as a member of the staff of U.S. 
Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, helping Magnuson draft and 
pass a piece of legislation—S. 4106, the National Health Service Bill.304  
The book illustrates how a web of interactions with a vast assortment of 
other people — bureaucrats, legislators, lobbyists, analysts and others — 
helped define the substance of the legislation as well as the path to 
passage in the Senate.305 
Another book, by way of illustration, Legislating Together: The 
White House and Capitol Hill From Eisenhower to Reagan306 by Mark 
A. Peterson, describes and theorizes about the web of interactions 
between Congress and the President in influencing how choices are 
made about the content of legislation and the process for its 
consideration and passage.  In colorful and humorous language, Peterson 
summarizes the web of interactions between federal legislators, the 
President, and others: 
An unusual menagerie—whales, boll weevils, gypsy moths, and lame 
ducks, not to mention lions and foxes. 
Assorted instruments of persuasion—whips, ships, telephones, tickets, 
planes, and (most infamous) “the Treatment.” 
Diverse forms of exercise—elbow bending, often “lifting a glass to 
liberty,” arm twisting, coalition building, and the taxing gymnastic 
maneuver of going over the heads of Congress. 
Utilitarian accounting conventions—political resources, currency, 
capital, and credits, all to be invested, expended, or squandered. 
A variety of social gatherings—parties, interest groups, voting groups, 
study groups, chowder and marching societies, constituencies, and the 
last tuition-free institution, the electoral college. 
Several inflatable objects—egos, rhetoric, positions, and consumer 
prices, though no ducks. 
Plotted “ayes” and crossed “tees,” especially committees, 
subcommittees, committees of the whole, committees on committees, 
 
 303. See ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. MARK A. PETERSON, LEGISLATING TOGETHER: THE WHITE HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL 
FROM EISENHOWER TO REAGAN (1990). 
53
Blomquist: The Good American Legislator
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BLOMQUIST1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:26 AM 
948 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:895 
committees to reelect, rules committees, special committees, select 
committees, and standing committees, since everyone is too busy to be 
sitting. 
Programs approved for many audiences—to be moved or lost, major 
releases and minor dramas, new innovations and old reruns, and much 
type casting. 
Finally, an assortment of letters to challenge even Johannes 
Gutenberg—from LAs, AAs, CBO, EOP, WHO, OMB, DC, OPD, 
PRMs, and the CEA, to OPL and OCL, the “liaison” d’être of the 
presidential-congressional relationship.307 
Surely, there is much new ground to explore regarding the complex, 
process-based subject of legislator webs of interaction—not simply from 
the political science perspective, but from the perspective of law.  Legal 
scholars should investigate, by way of example: interactions between 
legislators and intellectuals,308 interactions between legislators and 
legislators of other states and countries; interactions between legislators 
and influential members of the media; and interactions between 
legislators and the books they read.309 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The understanding by legal theorists of the role (or roles) of the 
individual legislator in the American legal system is in need of 
reexamination and illumination.  An efflorescence of theoretical 
understanding of the good American legislator could be achieved if legal 
scholars reconsidered the foundational legal process theory of Hart and 
Sacks, as well as new legal process perspectives of process-formalists, 
process-progressives, and process-pragmatists.310  Moreover, legal 
 
 307. Id. at x-xi. 
 308. Cf. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, THE TRUTH OF POWER: INTELLECTUAL AFFAIRS IN THE 
CLINTON WHITE HOUSE (2001); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: THE INTELLECTUAL IN PUBLIC LIFE 
(Robert A. Katzman ed., 1998); TEVI TROY, INTELLECTUALS AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: 
PHILOSOPHERS, JESTERS, OR TECHNICIANS? (2002). 
 309. Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) 
(discussing the bounded rationality of decision making by legal decision makers and the 
implications of limited cognitive resources on the quality of legal outputs like judicial opinions and 
legislative statutes). 
 310. Cf. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to 
the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113 (2003).  This is an interesting recent article 
arguing that legal process theory is one of “four approaches to have vied for dominance among legal 
scholars” during the last century until the present.  Id. at 2113.  According to Judge Calabresi, 
scholars of the legal process school are interested primarily in “comparative institutional analysis.”  
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theorists need to re-deploy, assimilate and build on predominantly 
political science writings dealing with legislative ethics, legislative 
advocacy and legislative webs to develop robust models of how the good 
American legislator can aspire to improve lawmaking, in both small and 
big ways.  The good legislator project, therefore, can assist in amplifying 
the emerging theoretical field of legisprudence.311 
 
Id. at 2123.  Moreover, Calabresi points out that new legal process theorists, known as “the 
Columbia School,” embrace “a spirit of Deweyen ‘experimentalism’ by focusing on the 
development of new institutions.”  Id. at 2125, n.50. 
 311. See LEGISPRUDENCE: A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATION (Luc J. 
Wintgens ed. 2002) [hereinafter LEGISPRUDENCE].  “Legisprudence has as its object legislation and 
regulation, making use of the theoretical tools and insights of legal theory.  The latter predominantly 
deals with the question of the application of law by the judge.  Legisprudence enlarges the field of 
study to include the creation of law by the legislator.”  Luc J. Wintgens, Rationality in Legislation 
— Legal Theory as Legisprudence: An Introduction in LEGISPRUDENCE supra at 2.  For a classic 
political science perspective on improving legislation see ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE 
COMMON GOOD (1983). 
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